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1.0 Introduction  
 
1.1 Old Bell 3 Ltd., in association with Dateb and Steve Raybould, was appointed 
by the Welsh Assembly Government in November 2010 to undertake an 
Investigative Study to Support the Higher Education (HE) Governance Review.  
 
1.2 The Review has been established by the Welsh Assembly Government and 
is chaired by John McCormick. It issued a questionnaire to all Welsh Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) about their current governance arrangements, 
issued a call for written evidence and interviewed a number of stakeholders. It 
will report in March 2011.  
 
1.3 The investigative study supports the Group by: 
 
• undertaking a comparative review of alternative HE governance 
arrangements, drawing on the available literature, concentrating on the 
governance of the HE sector as a whole and more particularly, the 
institutional relationships between Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and 
Government;   
 
• deepening the understanding of the current governance arrangements within 
Welsh HE emerging from the questionnaire by undertaking qualitative 
interviews with senior managers in Welsh HEIs, with a specific focus on: 
i) the effectiveness of current internal governance arrangements in 
providing strategic direction, oversight and scrutiny and in representing 
broader stakeholder interests;  
ii) the role of governors in ‘overseeing, and supporting collaboration, 
regional planning and merger’: and 
iii) the current relationship between HEIs, government and the Higher 
Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW) ‘as an intermediary body’. 
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1.5 The work programme underpinning this report has involved: 
 
• an extensive literature review;  
• individual face-to-face interviews with eight of the Chairs of Council/Board of 
Governors of Welsh HEIs and one Deputy Chair1; 
• face-to-face interviews with seven Vice-Chancellors, nine Clerks/Registrars2 
and two Pro Vice-Chancellors; 
• the Director of the Open University in Wales. 
 
1.6 There was a very high level of participation from HEIs, particularly in view of 
the very tight timescale set for the research: the research team is extremely 
grateful to all those who participated.  
 
1.7 In the remainder of this Report we firstly present (in Part I) the findings from 
our fieldwork with HEIs considering in turn: 
 
• Views on the appropriateness of the composition of Boards in terms of 
representing broader interests (Section 2); 
• Views on the utility of the Guidance issued by the Chairs of University 
Councils (CUC) and the extent to which this is reflected in practice (Section 
3); 
• Views on the recruitment and induction processes (Section 4); 
• Views on the effectiveness of Boards in terms of setting the strategic direction 
of Institutions (Section 5); 
• Views on the effectiveness of Boards in monitoring performance (Section 6);  
• Views on the extent to which Boards are engaged in the reconfiguration and 
collaboration agenda (Section 7); 
• Views on barriers to Boards working effectively (Section 8); 
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity and to preserve anonymity, we henceforth refer to each HEIs 
Governing Body as the “Board” (even though the term Council is used for the pre-1992 HEIs.  
2 Again, henceforth we use the word “Clerk”. 
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• Views on the relationships with the Welsh Assembly Government and the 
Higher Education Funding Council Wales (HEFCW) (Section 9). 
 
1.8 We then, in Part II turn to the findings from our literature review, setting out in 
in turn: 
• The background to the literature review (Section 10); 
• a brief review of the background to the higher education governance model in 
Wales, presenting some findings (and tensions) in relation to the 
effectiveness of the current approach (Section 11); 
• the findings of research into the effectiveness of the higher education 
governance structures in England and Scotland which share many of the 
characteristics of the Welsh model: wider UK research on the advantages and 
disadvantages of having more or less autonomy in higher education is also 
considered (Section 12);  
• some international developments in relation to autonomy in higher education 
(Section 13); 
• three international case studies that compare approaches to autonomy (and 
lessons learnt) in other regions and countries.(Section 14). 
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PART I: FINDINGS FROM THE FIELDWORK 
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2.0 Composition 
 
2.1 Most of those HEI representatives interviewed were broadly satisfied with the 
size and composition of their Board, though it was perhaps interesting that 
several of the Chairs were keen to contrast what they regarded as their good 
fortune in having strong Boards by comparison with other HEIs in Wales, one for 
example claiming that there were probably only around three Boards which were 
effective. Thus, one Clerk claimed that the current membership was ‘the most 
engaged, high calibre’ group in his career, while the Vice-Chancellor of another 
Institution saw his current Board as ‘very effective…[with the] necessary 
experience to challenge and influence the work of the University’.  
 
2.2. From the analysis of questionnaires it was clear that almost all the Boards 
consist of between 20 and 30 members, although Cardiff University is currently 
considering whether to reduce the size of its Council (currently 35 members). 
The pre-1992 Universities had generally reduced the size of their Boards over 
the last decade and longer-serving members of these Boards argued that this 
had had a positive effect in terms of ensuring a real engagement of members 
with governance issues. Some interviewees believed that Boards were still on 
the large side, particularly when compared to the private sector, though it was felt 
that reducing the numbers still further would compromise the ability of the Boards 
to achieve a good mix of skills and backgrounds. As it was, a small number of 
interviewees felt that it was impossible, even with current numbers, to ensure that 
the very broad range of interests which touched on the life of a University could 
be adequately represented within the Board (although most said that they had 
other ways of involving this broader network of stakeholders).  
 
2.3 Having said this, it was striking that, although the size of Boards varied 
relatively little, the composition of pre- and post-1992 Institutions was quite 
different, largely due to different statutory and regulatory regimes. The former 
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generally having larger numbers of staff representatives, and the latter having 
fewer staff, but also having a distinction between independent and co-opted 
members.       
  
2.4 In almost all of the HEIs, the majority of the work of the Board had been 
devolved to Committees. However, while some routinely co-opted external 
members onto these Committees as a way of broadening the expertise available 
and to avoid spreading members too thinly (and also in some Institutions, ‘trying 
out’ potential future Board members), others did not do so, with the exception of 
their Audit Committees.  
 
2.5 Almost without exception, Executive interviewees stressed that Board 
members were expected to make a very significant contribution in terms of their 
time, particularly given that the role was unpaid – ‘we ask a very great deal of 
them’ or ‘we rely very heavily on the lay members’ being typical comments. Most 
Chairs echoed this to a greater or lesser degree, with one arguing that the fact 
that the role was onerous but voluntary and unpaid was a ‘fundamental 
weakness’.  
 
2.6 The demands in terms of the required time commitment were widely seen as 
being one reason for what was admitted as being a problem, namely ensuring a 
suitable balance in terms of age profile, with lay members of Boards generally 
being aged 50 and above. A number of Institutions had clearly succeeded in 
attracting a fair proportion of members who were still working and many chose to 
hold Board and Committee meetings at times which were designed to make this 
possible, but there was as one Chair put it, a heavy reliance on the ‘young retired 
– those who have still got zest’.  
 
2.7 The requirement to involve lay members in additional tasks such as 
appointments panels or disciplinary hearings, as well as full Board and 
Committee meetings, was also a practical reason why Institutions tended to look 
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for members who were predominantly based relatively locally. This was 
perceived in Institutions away from South East Wales as constricting choice, 
particularly in respect of experience with big business (although there was a 
tendency for Chairs of pre-1992 Institutions in particular to be drawn much more 
widely).  
  
2.8 Almost all of the HEIs used either a formal or an informal ‘skills matrix’ to 
identify particular skills and experience which were required by the Board. 
Finance/accountancy, audit, HR, and estates/property expertise were areas 
which were frequently cited as being required, while an effort was also made to 
ensure balance between public and private sector experience, as well as to 
ensure a degree of gender balance and (though less commonly, given the 
demographic context of some parts of Wales) ethnic diversity. In some instances, 
it appeared that Executive teams made significant use of the professional skills 
on the Board to complement (and possibly even substitute for) paid-for advice 
and in-house expertise.  
 
2.9 While most Boards included at least some lay members with Executive 
experience of Higher Education (alongside the representation of staff from within 
the Institution), there was a view in some Institutions that the lack of current 
‘practitioners’ amongst the lay members was an issue in terms of ensuring that 
the Boards really had good ‘knowledge of the business of Higher Education’. A 
number of Chairs acknowledged the risk that Boards could have insufficient real 
detailed grasp of the specific issues to challenge the Executive. Appointing Board 
members who occupied senior positions in HEIs outside Wales was seen as one 
way of addressing this while a small number of interviewees argued that having 
some representation from the international academic community would be 
desirable.  
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2.10 Related to this, it was clear that the relations between the Board and the 
Academic Board or Senate3 were in most cases not entirely straightforward, 
despite the presence of members of the latter on the former: one Vice-
Chancellor, noted that ‘they [the Board] do struggle with the Senate’, while Board 
members had a standing invitation to attend the Senate and one or more usually 
did so, they usually seemed to find the discourse there ‘opaque’. Efforts in some 
Institutions were made to address this through such invitations to attend the 
Senate or through joint Away Days, but in at least one, the Board itself had 
decided it was not appropriate for its members to become involved in the 
workings of the Senate.  
 
2.11 Almost all interviewees argued that there was no evidence of particular 
groups within the Board contributing less than others, though this was often 
coupled with the view that members most often had their say through 
Committees rather than at the full Board, or conversely of any one constituency 
dominating debate, arguing that Chairs almost invariably worked hard to ensure 
participation by all. In two HEIs, interviewees argued that academic staff 
represented on, or attending, the Board were more reticent to speak up, with this 
being attributed to a fear of being seen to step out of line with the Executive.     
 
2.12 However, most commented that it did take new members time to ‘get up to 
speed’ – with it relatively often being said that it took members at least a year to 
become confident in contributing: ‘it takes one to two years before they are really 
comfortable’. 
 
2.13 This was often coupled with an argument in favour of the practice of more or 
less automatically renewing members’ mandates after a first term, and against 
the external recruitment of Chairs who did not have prior experience of the work 
of the Board.  
                                                 
3 Henceforth, we use Senate as the generic term, though the term Academic Board is used in 
post-1992 Institutions. 
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 2.14 Possibly related to this, a majority of the Chairs made a specific point of 
commenting on the fact that they made a considerable effort to ensure that 
Student representatives were fully engaged in the debate at the Board (given that 
these typically changed annually). It was notable that most Chairs were very alert 
to the importance of listening to the ‘student voice’, seeing the current students 
as a key stakeholder: ‘students are key. They are our customers and the 
customer is king’. 
 
2.15 More generally, most (but not all) interviewees thought that there was 
considerable cut and thrust within the debate at Board meetings and even more 
within Committees, a typical comment being that ‘lay members are not reticent 
about challenging issues if they don’t understand what they’re hearing’. However, 
a small number of interviewees (from at least two Institutions) disagreed, with 
one contrasting anodyne Board meetings at present with more fiery discussions 
in the more distant past and saying he had been trying to establish why ‘some of 
the people I had helped to appoint were not making the contribution …I had 
expected to them to do from their interview’. 
 
2.16 A number of the interviewees were keen to challenge a view attributed to 
the Minister for Education that Boards were ‘the last resting place of the 
crachach’. In reality, it certainly appeared true that the extent to which Boards 
were filled by the ‘great and the good’ varied, largely according to the two factors 
of distance from Cardiff and the research credentials of the Institution. Indeed, in 
a number of the post-1992 Institutions, one reasonably well worn (but perhaps 
unexpected) route onto the Board appeared to be from school governors.  
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3.0 CUC Guidance  
 
3.1 In general terms, Chairs were clearly familiar with the CUC Guide, though it 
appeared that for many of them the Guide was not a regular source of reference. 
Thus one talked of it ‘not being something we’ve had a lot to do with’, another 
argued that the Guide was too long and detailed for members to use routinely, 
and a third saying that ‘it’s quite a long time since I looked at it’.  
 
3.2 By contrast, Clerks and other Executive interviewees tended to be more 
effusive about the Guide. One argued that the Guide was well grounded in 
thorough research and that it was a relief to no longer have to ‘make it up as we 
go along’, while another, in contrast to the comments of Chairs, said that the 
language used was particularly appropriate to lay members and argued that the 
CUC Guide was particularly useful for members (although less so for officers as 
it was not detailed enough to satisfy their needs).  
 
3.3 The Guide was for most Institutions a core part of the briefing pack given to 
new Board members. However, even amongst Clerks, there was at least one 
sceptic who believed that few of his members had read the guidance and that 
there was an element of ‘overkill’, not least in the production of a series of ‘short 
guides’. This interviewee was critical of the fact that, in their view, the CUC failed 
to provide clear cut guidance on issues such as the extent to which Board 
members were individually as well as corporately liable for any mismanagement 
at the Institution.  
 
3.4 None of the interviewees identified any ways in which their Institution 
diverged from the CUC Guide, though in one case, it had had to be 
supplemented in order to ensure issues related to the bilingual nature of the HEI 
were fully covered. At the same time, it does need to be said that in the case of 
terms of office, a number of Board members appeared to have served for terms 
considerably longer than those recommended by the Guidance.  
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 4.0 Recruitment and Induction 
 
4.1 Most interviewees said that it was ‘difficult but not impossible’ to recruit 
appropriately qualified individuals as new lay members of Boards. Some 
Executive interviewees, in particular, thought this was surprising, in light of their 
view that the role could be extraordinarily demanding given its unpaid and 
voluntary nature. There were differences of view as to whether it was becoming 
more difficult or not, though difficulties with finding appropriate candidates were 
most commonly associated with needing to fill specific gaps in the skills matrix, 
such as accountants and lawyers. Without exception, interviewees insisted that 
they would leave places empty rather than recruit insufficiently qualified 
individuals. 
 
4.2 A large number of interviewees referred to the discussion at the recent Chairs 
of Higher Education Wales (CHEW) event of recruitment to Boards, and 
commented on what they believed was the Minister’s misinterpretation of the role 
of informal networks in recruitment. Almost all of the Institutions appeared either 
routinely or normally to use public adverts (mostly through the press, as well as 
through their websites etc.) as a recruitment tool, though there were varying 
degrees of enthusiasm for this. Some interviewees argued that it was relatively 
ineffective to use paid for advertising for unpaid posts – ‘who is going to be 
attracted to an unpaid position through a cold advert?’ – and others were 
relatively scathing about the results, arguing that they attracted insufficient 
applications from people of the ‘right calibre’: ‘last time, we had three applications 
... the most suitable was from a man in his 80s who didn’t like to drive at night’. 
 
4.3 For these interviewees, advertising was principally a means of being seen to 
be transparent and open, rather than a useful way of attracting new members. 
Others had somewhat more positive experiences, though it seemed generally 
true that only a minority of members were recruited directly as a result of 
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applications as a result of such open adverts. More useful for some was the use 
of the Public Appointments website, though at least one Clerk had been told that 
a vacancy could not be advertised formally through Public Appointments Wales, 
because the University was not a public body (though informal help had been 
forthcoming which had resulted in an appointment).  
 
4.4 However, interviewees from every Institution insisted that the use of formal 
and informal networks (both those of the Institution and of its staff) to identify and 
encourage potential applicants (which one interviewee termed ‘internal executive 
search’) was essential, particularly in view of the need to ensure an appropriate 
mix of skills, experience and characteristics on the Board as a whole. It was 
argued vigorously that ‘sometimes relying on the tap on the shoulder is inevitable 
...you just have to’ if, for example, the Chair of the Audit Committee was retiring 
and another Board member with very solid audit and accountancy experience 
was required.  
 
4.5 Some interviewees went further and suggested it was also important to 
ensure that potential recruits could fit in with the existing culture and ethos of the 
Board: ‘you don’t want a Board fighting itself’. However, most were insistent that 
this was not the same as wanting only to recruit members in the same image as 
those in place – though with the rider that, of course, members had to be 
committed to the values of the Institution and intellectually capable of making a 
contribution: ‘you want independent minded people, aligned to the missions and 
values certainly, but who won’t just acquiesce’. In this context, for some 
Institutions, alumni network were an important source of recruits. 
 
4.6 However, interviewees argued that any appearance of ‘the old boys’ network’ 
was misleading with the telephone call out of the blue to a potential candidate 
being ‘just the tip of the iceberg, coming after a long process’. It was argued that 
however individuals were identified, all Institutions had a formal process to 
scrutinise nominations, while most – particularly post-1992 HEIs – required a 
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formal application even from those who had been invited to apply and/or had a 
formal interview as part of the appointments process. A key part of this was said 
to be less scrutinising the suitability of the candidate than explaining the nature of 
the commitment to ensure that applicants were not under any misapprehension. 
 
4.7 As already noted, a number of HEIs routinely co-opted non Board members 
onto their Committees and this was seen as a useful way of providing a pool of 
potential recruits to the full Board. Similarly, a number of Institutions were able to 
use more broadly-based stakeholder bodies as a way of identifying potential 
future members. 
 
4.8 In terms of induction, most interviewees were relatively positive about the 
arrangements in place, though Chairs were somewhat more nuanced in their 
views, with one, for example, arguing that in the past this had been a ‘bit 
amateurish’ and another suggesting that it was only in the very recent past that 
the induction process had consisted of much more than a meeting with the Vice-
Chancellor.   
 
4.9 However, for the most part it appeared that, while new board members were 
given extensive written material (with most Institutions having a handbook for 
new Governors, drawn on a number of sources, including the CUC Guide), initial 
induction training was in many cases quite light touch, often involving a one-day 
series of briefings with the Chair and key Executive members.  
 
4.10 However, interviewees in many cases argued that there was a continuous 
process of briefing members, often including regular briefing sessions from 
Faculties/Schools on a rotational basis associated with Board meetings, with one 
Clerk saying that ‘induction is a process rather than an event …[it’s] about 
relationship building as well as building new members’ expertise’.  Moreover, in a 
handful of Institutions, there was a formal ‘twinning’ arrangement between 
individual Board members and Faculties, designed to enable members to really 
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get to grips with concerns at the ‘chalk face’ – though others had considered this 
and rejected on the basis that it ran the risk of turning individual members into 
the advocates for sectional interests on the Board.  
 
4.11 While mentoring arrangements were rare, a number of Chairs also had 
annual one-to-one sessions with each board member as a way of teasing out 
concerns or requirements in terms of further briefing or training.  
 
4.12 A number of interviewees argued that more could and should be done to 
provide greater cross-Institution induction and training activities (‘there ought to 
be a training programme across Wales at minimal cost in how to be an effective 
Board member’), though it was recognised that considerable progress had been 
made, and that it was probably impossible to insist on individual Board members 
attending such sessions as they were serving in a voluntary capacity. It was felt 
that exposure to other Boards was a really positive experience.  
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5.0 Boards’ Role in Providing Strategic Direction 
 
5.1 The overwhelming majority of interviewees argued that their own Board 
played a key role in the development of institutional strategy and, in this regard, 
felt equipped to challenge and interrogate the proposals made by the Executive. 
Typical comments were: 
 
‘They [Board Members] are not there for a free lunch and a cosy chat 
…they take their responsibilities very seriously’. (Clerk) 
 
‘You can’t have people of the calibre of [name] on the board and not have 
forensic scrutiny’. (Vice-Chancellor) 
 
5.2 Techniques which were thought to be effective in ensuring that Boards made 
a real contribution to setting institutional strategy included: 
 
• engaging them early in annual planning process (often through away 
days at the start of the session): this was the case in most Institutions, 
though in at least four this was something which was either very recent 
or only in prospect: one Chair expressed frustration that to date, the 
Board had done little more than sign off the completed Strategic Plan 
(usually without the detailed budget annexes) at the final meeting before 
the year end and another – commenting about other Institutions rather 
than their own –  thought that it this was relatively common with 
‘Governing Bodies just end[ing] up improving the punctuation’;  
• actively engaging Board members in major reviews of strategy, which in 
at least four cases were either underway or had recently been 
completed, either through joint steering groups or through an iterative 
process between the Executive and external consultants and the Board; 
• in a minority of cases, using a fairly powerful strategy committee, often 
bringing together the key members, to take an ongoing interest in 
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strategy and the external policy environment in which it was being 
implemented: though in at least one case, the merger of two committees 
to form a single committee overseeing both finance and policy was being 
resisted by the Executive on the grounds it might constitute an Executive 
of the Board; 
• more generally, delegating work down to the committees (with the board 
just endorsing agreed actions) in order to free up the board for horizon 
scanning and strategy development: one argued that this was: ‘a 
powerful way of bringing new Governors in…dealing with the “meat” of 
issues …and freeing up the Board to deal with really strategic issues, the 
issues where the Board as a whole needs to sign up’. 
 
 
5.2 At the same time, it did seem reasonably clear that the drive and direction of 
strategic planning came from, and was expected to come from, the Executive. 
Some Chairs felt strongly that this should be the case, with one joking that it was 
the Vice-Chancellor who was ‘paid to have sleepless nights’ and another making 
a similar point: 
 
‘It [the Strategic Plan] is assembled by the Executive ...you have to recognise 
that the Executive is full time, the Governing Body is part-time and unpaid – you 
can’t cascade down to every little stone and turn it over ...We use the Executive 
to provide the defined route ... and the Governors are there to tweak it’. 
 
5.3 Two Vice-Chancellors similarly argued that it was unreasonable to expect a 
Board to originate strategy, as opposed to providing interrogation and challenge, 
while another noted that a recent major review of Corporate Strategy had 
involved the Board spending ‘several hours’ discussing various issues and 
proposals put forward by the Executive which had led to the Executive being 
charged with making refinements in response to those discussions before a 
further discussion at the next Board meeting.  
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 5.4 More generally it seemed clear that Boards were relatively rarely offered a 
range of options to consider and decide between. This point was made strongly 
by one interviewee who was unusual in expressing strong doubts that the current 
Governance arrangements allowed Boards to even influence strategy in any 
meaningful way: 
 
‘I’m a bit of a maverick in my view ...but I think we could actually do 
without governance ...It isn’t all its cracked up to be …They [Board 
members]  are meant to be the authority in law and to delegate it to the 
Vice-Chancellor, but in reality its the Vice-Chancellor running the ship and 
they are just passengers on it’.  
 
5.5. This interviewee argued that it was wholly unreasonable to expect ‘a body 
which meets five times a year and doesn’t have any detailed knowledge of the 
Institution [to] really be a Corporation which controls an Institution with a £[xx] 
million turnover’. 
 
5.6 Perhaps in line with this more sceptical view, when asked to identify 
examples where the Board had disagreed with or forced a change to the 
Executive’s strategic direction, most interviewees were unable to do so or 
pointed to relatively practical issues, such as the site plan of a new development 
or the marketing strategy, rather than fundamental questions of missions and 
values. However, there were some examples where Chairs and Boards did have 
different views than the Executive on key strategic issues (e.g. the role of 
research, the degree of engagement with other HEIs, the need for internal 
restructuring), though in all of these cases except the last, the difference had not 
led to any significant change. In this context, one Vice-Chancellor argued 
strongly that the nature of the Board’s shaping of the strategic agenda was 
incremental, with informal discussions and work in committees teasing out the 
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Board’s priorities and the Executive reshaping and refining its approach to 
address any concerns before disagreement became visible.  
 
5.7 More generally, almost all interviewees argued that a close working 
relationship between Chair and Vice-Chancellor was critical to ensuring the 
smooth running of the Institution, though this did not mean that relationships 
were always good. In general terms, it appeared that Chairs of post-1992 
Institutions were more ‘present’ than their opposite numbers in the pre-1992s, but 
across the board, regular (weekly or fortnightly) one-to-one discussions appeared 
to be the general rule, while in several instances, Chairs clearly spent part of 
several days each week on University business.  
 
5.8 Many interviewees emphasised the importance of using these meetings to 
ensure there were ‘no surprises’ when business came to Committee or the full 
Board. This could involve sorting out disagreements behind closed doors – one 
Chair acknowledging that ‘we’ve certainly had stand up shouting sessions’ – 
even though several argued that the environment in more formal meetings was 
such that public challenge was appropriate.  
 
5.9 Several Chairs also emphasised the importance of mentoring and providing a 
sounding board for Vice-Chancellors in what could be quite a lonely role: 
 
‘I think the role of Vice Chancellor is interesting because like all numero uno’s it 
can be quite a lonely existence. And that’s as it should be of course. There 
should be that distance between the top man and other members of staff. But the 
problem then is who does the Vice Chancellor go to to bounce ideas off? Who’s 
his sounding board?  For [name] that sounding board is me’. 
 
5.10 Finally, while few interviewees specifically commented on this, even where 
Chairs spent relatively significant amounts of time working within the Institutions, 
it was striking that they generally had neither offices, nor administrative or 
 20
secretarial assistance. While this was clearly regarded as standard practice – 
and indeed, as important in distinguishing between the Executive and the non-
Executive – this is, of course, in sharp contrast to large private sector 
organisations where even non-Executive Chairs would be expected to have an 
independent support structure in place.  
 
5.11 In several cases, Clerks stressed however that they and their support staff 
reported directly to the Board rather than to the Vice-Chancellor. 
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6.0 Boards’ Role in Monitoring Performance  
 
6.1 As with Boards’ capacity to set the strategic direction of their Institutions, so 
most interviewees argued forcefully that their Board was able to monitor the 
performance and effectiveness of the Institution, albeit mostly at a high level and 
relying heavily on the Committee structure to drill down into some more detailed 
issues. Chairs and Executive alike tended to argue that the composition of 
Boards allowed for ‘forensic’ examination and interrogation of performance.   
 
6.2 Most placed considerable weight on a core set of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs)  and it was clear that, in some Institutions, a lot of work had gone into 
refining these and relating them more closely to strategic planning: in one case, 
for example, these had been winnowed down to 13 core indicators. In another 
case, the Executive reported against all 60 objectives at each Board meeting with 
the Vice-Chancellor noting that: 
 
‘there is a written update on each of the objectives and targets ...there is 
no stone to hide under, the Chair goes through it page by page’, 
 
although the Chair in the same HEI thought that the health of the Institution could 
be gauged by a very small number of headline indicators: 
 
‘if you are not recruiting students, if there’s no money in the bank, if there 
are constant complaints from the Students Union, you get the message’. 
 
6.3 A minority of interviewees felt that they still had some way to go to making 
KPIs useful to the Board, with one noting that setting KPIs ‘became an industry’ 
in which the utility of the traffic light system which had been developed was open 
to question: ‘One of the more perceptive of the Board asked “why are there no 
‘red lights’ if we are supposed to be setting KPIs which are challenging?”’. 
Another reported a conflict with the Executive, where the latter believed that the 
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data underpinning two of what were from the Board’s point of view most 
important KPIs was worthless.  
 
6.4 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, information management more generally was a 
concern of some Chairs – with a feeling that Boards were in some instances 
overwhelmed with papers and were hampered from doing their job by this 
(‘papers can really get in the way of discussion’) – though Clerks and Vice-
Chancellors tended to be more sanguine. In one case, a Clerk had addressed 
this by ensuring that every paper was accompanied by a short briefing note 
outlining the main issues and decisions required but this was clearly not 
universally the case.  
 
6.5 There was generally considerable confidence in Boards’ capacity to 
undertake financial monitoring and control, with most interviewees arguing that 
the presence of (serving or retired) senior accountancy or public finance 
professionals on key committees gave a strong assurance in this regard.  
 
6.6 Indeed, it seemed clear that Boards more generally were more confident in 
dealing with what might be termed generic aspects of HEIs operations (Estates 
and HR were two other areas which were often mentioned where the Board had 
expertise and was particularly active in scrutinising the Executive) than in dealing 
with the core academic ‘product’ (whether teaching or research). Most 
interviewees emphasised that significant attention was devoted to the quality of 
the student experience and some also mentioned that Boards were kept closely 
in touch with the work of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) – with one Board 
also insisting on sampling the reports of external examiners as a way of gauging 
quality of provision. But a minority of Chairs and Executive interviewees (mostly 
but not exclusively in the post-1992 Institutions) explicitly acknowledged that 
Board members often lacked confidence in dealing with issues of academic 
structures or provision. 
 
 23
6.7 Thus, a Clerk commented that the Board was ‘happy dealing with finance and 
estates, and with the main issues of strategic planning but the more academic 
work doesn’t come their way to the same extent’, while a Chair admitted that, in 
relation to the teaching provision ‘there’s a bit of a knowledge gap …it’s the area 
of least comfort for the Board because of lack of knowledge’.  
 
6.8 More generally, one of the most common observations from Chairs, in 
particular, was that ‘we don’t know what we don’t know’ – that the whole edifice 
of governance was based on trust that the Executive was not withholding key 
information.  
 
6.9 In terms of monitoring the effectiveness of governance arrangements 
themselves, many Institutions undertook an internal self-evaluation of the Board 
each year, while more formal mechanisms were in place for regular 
(quinquennial or sexennial) reviews, following CUC Guidance. Some with 
relatively recent experience of these were not entirely positive about the results, 
with one more extreme view being that: ‘I was disappointed by the results ...The 
Executive had too much control of it, deciding what things should be ruled out’. 
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7.0 Boards’ Engagement with Reconfiguration and Collaboration 
 
7.1 Almost every interviewee argued that the question of reconfiguration and 
collaboration figured large on their Board’s agenda (two, for example, noting that 
their Boards ‘spent two years discussing a potential merger’ which ultimately did 
not go ahead) and Chairs generally demonstrated considerable awareness of the 
history and current state of play with regard to discussions both with other HEIs 
and Further Education Institutions (though perhaps inevitably it was for the post-
1992 Institutions that potential mergers with FEIs were most in focus).  
 
7.2 Moreover, a perhaps surprising number of interviewees claimed to have 
sympathy for the principle of fewer, larger Institutions (though in this context, one 
Vice-Chancellor railed against ‘mechanisms in place that prevent us from 
growing’) and for enhanced collaboration with a view to reducing ‘nugatory 
competition, as Rhodri Morgan used to say’. There were exceptions, however, 
including from interviewees within some of the Institutions most actively pursuing 
mergers, who argued that the case had not been proven that larger institutions 
would be more effective.  
 
7.3 If Boards were aware of, and generally embracing this agenda, it was not 
necessarily case that they were driving it. One Clerk argued that his Board had 
thrown itself consecutively into the detail of a number of merger discussions, 
without ever having a clear discussion of what the potential options were for 
collaborative relationships or mergers, and other interviewees gave the 
impression that (as with strategy more generally) there was relatively little 
appraisal of options in terms of the reconfiguration agenda: it was often left to the 
Executive to moot possible collaborations, with the Board reacting to, critiquing 
and commenting on proposals.  
 
7.4 A number of (mostly Executive) interviewees clearly felt that the agenda was 
in fact driven by Welsh Assembly Government policy (and more particularly the 
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prospect of major upheaval in funding arrangements) rather than by any internal 
logic: 
 
‘If you were to ask why there has been more change in this part of Wales 
than any other parts of Wales – in terms of policy change – then I think 
this is down to the dynamics of a governing body which is alert to the 
changing policy requirements and can respond to it, but has also an 
appropriate relationship with officers from within the institution to make 
change happen’. 
 
7.5 Along with the professed willingness to consider structural change, there was 
also a common tendency to blame other Institutions for the blocking or failure of 
potential mergers, though a minority of interviewees also argued that the Welsh 
Assembly Government and HEFCW had been insufficiently forceful in the past in 
curbing the aggressive expansionist tendencies of other HEIs and to themselves 
get involved in brokering structural change, with one Vice-Chancellor, for 
example, arguing that: 
 
‘there is need for help to guide universities – policies are all very well and 
good but don’t help with the implementation. There is nobody who has an 
objectivity about this to help broker these changes – there is a crying need 
for this …I think HEFCW could do much more than they currently do’.  
 
7.6 Generally, interviewees argued that there was ‘not a cigarette paper between 
the Board and the Executive’ in terms of their views on potential mergers or other 
forms of collaboration (though in one case a Chair did believe on a personal level 
that the Executive was insufficiently engaged). Where both Chairs and Executive 
were from the same Institution were interviewed separately, the views expressed 
were also virtually identical.  
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7.7 However, while a small number of interviewees argued that Boards were in 
principle less likely to favour the status quo than Executive teams, whose jobs 
might be at risk, in reality, it appeared that at the margin, Boards were often more 
cautious in their approach to potential structural change. Thus in the case of one 
relatively recent merger discussion, it was said that ‘governors were very 
concerned about whether it was the right thing to do’, while in another Institution, 
it was said to have been ‘a Board decision not to go ahead with [a specific] 
merger at the end of the day’. The same Board had also expressed serious 
doubts about a much more limited transfer of provision to another Institution, 
which, it was argued, undermined the Institution’s standing in the area. In a third 
case, a Clerk commented that the Board was supportive of moves to strengthen 
the critical mass of the University and joint working, but noted that the Board was 
absolutely committed to preserving the identity of the Institution and would stop 
short of any course of action which did not do this. 
 
7.8 In many ways, the fact that Boards may be more resistant than Executives to 
radical structural change should not be so surprising, since the main role of the 
member (certainly as a Trustee under the Charities Act, as they have recently 
become) is to act in the best interests of the organisation, rather than the broader 
public good. In this context it was interesting that in the case of the Institution 
whose Chair argued that the Board’s main duties were to the students, the Vice-
Chancellor argued that: 
 
‘For him, it’s all about what’s best for the students, whereas for me it’s 
about what’s best for the students and the staff’.  
 
7.9 While the Chairs and Executive interviewees from post 1992 Institutions were 
more likely to acknowledge a broader duty to the specific region in which they 
were based (something which was more problematic for their pre-1992 
counterparts who relied heavily on recruiting students and winning research 
contracts from across the UK and the wider world), this comment illustrated the 
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strong focus of most interviewees on promoting the good of the individual 
Institution and considering structural change through the prism of the immediate 
benefits from an institutional perspective. As one interviewee pointed out, this 
might suggest a certain circularity of the current governance model whereby 
Boards were appointed to uphold the interests of the Institution which appointed 
them, rather than any failure of Boards to discharge their duties conscientiously.  
 
7.10 Having said this, it was clear that where mergers had taken place, Boards 
had generally been extremely active in steering and managing the process, 
particularly in terms of exercising due diligence.  
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8.0 Barriers to Effectiveness 
 
8.1 As will already be clear, most interviewees argued strongly that governance 
arrangements (at least within their own Institution) were working well and 
identified few barriers to the effectiveness of the Board. One Vice-Chancellor, for 
example, argued that his Board was  
 
‘independent, has integrity of opinion, is ready to challenge officers, ready 
to manage risks and as a unit is very prepared to take decisions that have 
major implications. It also has an element of maturity in terms of 
interpreting policy. You only have to look at the outputs achieved to see 
this’. 
 
8.2 Only two actual or potential barriers to effectiveness were identified on a fairly 
consistent basis, though in each case, by only a minority of interviewees.  
 
8.3 The first was the inherent challenge of attracting and retaining the necessary 
commitment in terms of time and expertise from individuals acting on a voluntary 
and unpaid basis:   
 
‘the big issue for us is attracting and recruiting strong people – this is the 
biggest anxiety’. 
 
8.4 However, none of those interviewed favoured moving to a system of paying 
Board members, even if this were possible. It was argued that this would lead to 
the attraction of ‘mercenaries’ and that Boards would lose ‘the moral high ground’ 
which they were said to currently possess. Executive interviewees tended to 
argue that it would be impossible or unacceptable to pay members in a way 
which equated to their skills and experience and interviewees with experience of 
the private sector or of government bodies where non-Executives were paid 
argued there was little evidence this improved corporate governance: indeed, 
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one interviewee with long experience of the Boards of major private companies 
argued that paid Non Executive Directors often ended up having too big a stake 
in not rocking the boat and maintaining the status quo.  
 
8.5 Moreover, a number of Clerks noted that they had had significant problems 
with their Charity Commission registration following the inclusion of Welsh HEIs 
under the recent Charities Act because of the payments made to academic staff 
who were also members of the Board. In their view, charitable status made it 
virtually impossible to provide remuneration for individual Board members for 
fulfilling this role. 
 
8.6 The second factor which was widely cited as impeding Boards’ effectiveness 
was the rate of change in the external policy agenda, and particularly what was 
seen as the rapid development of the Welsh Assembly Government’s approach 
to Higher Education.  A number of interviewees pointed out that the flurry of 
consultations over the summer period had made it impossible to engage Boards 
effectively in responding, while in many (but not all) cases, Boards’ opportunity to 
actively engage with the recent Regional Plan submissions had been very 
limited. Thus one Clerk argued that ‘the very rate of change tends to lead to a 
foreclosure of the options’. 
  
8.7 Other than these (and the limitations with regard to knowledge and 
experience of the core academic business of Higher Education highlighted 
above) barriers which were highlighted by individual or a handful of interviewees 
included: 
 
• the lack of opportunities for ordinary Board members (as opposed to Chairs) 
to meet and discuss with their opposite numbers in other Institutions in order 
to ‘see the bigger picture ...the ordinary lay member isn’t exposed in quite the 
same way to the debate’; 
• the lack of a strong enough perspective from outside Wales on Boards;  
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• in post-1992 Institutions, the legal requirement to distinguish between 
Independent and Co-opted Members, which reduced the number of lay 
members available for certain key functions (e.g. to do with appointments and 
disciplinary matters); 
• the weight of legal and regulatory responsibilities which were carried by 
Boards, and which required various policies and procedures (equal 
opportunities, health and safety, protection of vulnerable adults, anti-bullying, 
audit etc.) to be formally considered by the Board. 
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9.0 Relations with the Welsh Assembly Government and HEFCW  
 
9.1 Most interviewees argued that Boards were kept fully briefed on policy 
developments emanating from the Welsh Assembly Government and the UK 
Government (notably the Browne Review). Briefings on critical developments in 
the external environment were generally included in Vice-Chancellors’ papers to 
Board meetings, while some Institutions had specific Committees charged with 
monitoring such issues. While the full texts of policy documents were generally 
circulated to Board members, some Clerks argued that Government could do a 
better job of ensuring that Executive Summaries could serve as stand-alone 
documents. 
 
9.2 Almost all of those interviewed believed that the Welsh Assembly 
Government agenda as set out in ‘For our Future’ was clear and consistent, even 
where they disagreed with certain aspects of it. A majority tended to express 
support for the main elements of the Strategy, and even for the robust way in 
which it was being pursued, with one Chair saying that the Minister’s bullishness 
was understandable given that Universities in Wales ‘have been asked nicely for 
change by successive Ministers and have played for time’. 
 
9.3 The main concern voiced by interviewees from a number of pre-1992 
Institutions was what was perceived as a lack of focus on the international 
environment in which research-focused Universities were working in, with one 
Vice-Chancellor arguing that: 
 
‘our role is to compete globally – we serve Wales by being globally strong, 
but main policy documents such as ‘For Our Future’, don’t mention the 
word internationalisation’. 
 
9.4 There were varied views of the extent of political contact between Institutions 
and the Welsh Assembly Government (with pre-1992 Institutions generally 
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feeling better connected), though in general terms, there was a concern that 
Ministers were not particularly keen at listening to Boards’ views. One Chair 
argued strongly that the lack of engagement with Boards (with, for example, 
correspondence routinely sent to Vice-Chancellors rather than to Chairs) made 
the alleged lack of ‘clout’ of Boards vis-à-vis the Executive a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and thought that while CHEW was making progress, it remained the 
poor relation, commenting that in the trilateral meetings between CHEW, HEW 
and HEFCW ‘the Vice Chancellors come with their agenda, HEFCW have their 
agenda and the Chairs come and have tea and a sandwich’. 
 
9.5 Most interviewees reported having very little contact with Welsh Assembly 
Government officials. The majority also felt that this was appropriate, given the 
arms length relationship although one Clerk argued that: ‘If you want a managed 
economy in higher education with regional planning, it probably does require a 
direct relationship between DCELLS and HEIs.’ 
 
9.6 However, there was some criticism of what was perceived as a lack of 
knowledge of the sector on the part of officials and ‘a lack of collective memory’, 
given the high turn over of senior staff.  
 
9.7 Most interviewees echoed the official position of CHEW and HEW in 
expressing fairly strong formal support for HEFCW because, firstly, of a view that 
of principle it was desirable to have an arms length body to take decisions over 
resource allocation that impacted differentially on different parts of the country 
and, secondly, because of a degree of respect for the specialist knowledge and 
expertise of the Council (‘a pool of expertise that is useful’). 
 
9.8 However, at the same time, a minority of interviewees argued that HEFCW 
was not really fulfilling its potential in terms of providing a strategic lead to the 
sector and in practice operated principally as a funding agency. In practice, this 
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was linked by some to the evidence that HEFCW was now kept on a very short 
rein by the Welsh Assembly Government.   
 
9.9 More widely, interviewees did not think that there was any evidence of any 
significant difference in message coming from HEFCW than from the Welsh 
Assembly Government, though one worried that in developments such as taking 
forward the regional agenda, HEFCW had just added an unnecessary layer of 
complexity and bureaucracy to a concept from the Minister which was quite 
straightforward, and that any capacity of HEFCW to provide a buffer between the 
Welsh Assembly Government and Institutions that might once have existed had 
been sharply reduced: ‘if it’s a buffer then it doesn’t have much absorptive 
capacity’. 
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10. Background to the Literature Review 
10.1 Phase 2 of The Independent Review of Higher Education in Wales reported 
to the Welsh Assembly Government in April 2009. The review, chaired by 
Professor Merfyn Jones, considered fundamental issues around the future 
mission, purpose, role and funding of higher education in Wales. In particular, a 
clear message was formed that despite making significant progress in recent 
years, higher education in Wales needed to change to meet the needs of Wales 
in the global economy.4  
 
10.2 Drawing upon the findings of the Merfyn Jones Report and the wider One 
Wales Strategic Framework5, the Welsh Assembly Government published ‘For 
Our Future’, the new Strategy for higher education in Wales.6  The Strategy 
made clear the need for a decisive response from the higher education sector in 
Wales. Marginal or transactional change would be insufficient in both ensuring 
the long term success of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and fully 
capitalizing on their potential impact on the wider economy and society in Wales.   
 
10.3 Central to achieving the necessary change was a transformation in the 
relationship between Government and the higher education sector. What was 
needed was a step change defined by the creation of a national higher education 
system for Wales where HEIs and wider stakeholders all work together to 
complement and enhance their individual strengths and missions.7   
 
10.4 Higher education is a 'devolved' area, which means that most strategic level 
decisions that are made about higher education in Wales are taken by the Welsh 
                                                 
4 Welsh Assembly Government (April 2009) Review of Higher Education in Wales Phase 2 
Report presented by the Task and Finish group Chaired by Professor Merfyn Jones, WAG: 
Cardiff 
5 Welsh Assembly Government (June 2007) One Wales – A Progressive Agenda for the 
Government of Wales  An agreement between the Labour and Plaid Cymru Groups in the 
National Assembly, WAG: Cardiff 
6 Welsh Assembly Government (November 2009) For Our Future: The 21st Century Higher 
Education Strategy for Wales, WAG: Cardiff 
7 ibid 
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Assembly Government.  HEIs in Wales also receive a substantial portion of their 
income from public funds provided by the Assembly. In receipt of this public 
money the Welsh Assembly Government is keen that HEIs should be more 
accountable and more responsive to national needs defined by the strategic 
goals of the Assembly.8
 
10.5 However, HEIs in Wales also receive income from a number of other 
sources, including student fees, research projects and commercial activities. 
They are constituted as private bodies independent of government.  Historically 
they have guarded their sense of independence fiercely. 
 
10.6 The Welsh Assembly Government is also restricted by law in directing 
higher education. Section 68 of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 
(FHEA 92) allows Welsh Ministers to make grants to higher education by way of 
the intermediary Higher Education Funding Council Wales (HEFCW) but 
prevents the Welsh Ministers from funding or directing the funding to particular 
courses or specific institutions. 
 
10.7 Against this background, this review considers what the literature has to say 
with regard to ‘the effectiveness of current lines of direction and levels of 
accountability between government and the universities in terms of the delivery 
of national strategies’, considering in particular the effectiveness of the current 
model of governance in Wales, in comparison with other national models of 
governance.   
 
                                                 
8 Welsh Assembly Government (2009) Report on the Citizen-Centred Governance Review of the 
Higher Education  Funding Council for Wales, Performance and Governance, WAG: Cardiff 
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11. Autonomy and Accountability in Welsh Higher Education 
 
Towards a funding council model in Wales 
 
11.1 Issues of autonomy and accountability within higher education are not new. 
From the early self-governing Guilds of Masters of Arts at Oxford and Cambridge 
in the thirteenth century, HEIs have fought to maintain their independence, and 
not without success.9  However, over the last half century there has been a clear 
diminution of HEI autonomy across the UK.10  
 
11.2 For much of the twentieth century the University Grants Committee (UGC) 
represented the interface between the UK government and higher education 
institutions.11 The UGC – comprised of a small group of senior (often retired) 
university staff - was established by a Treasury Minute in July 1919 to:  
 
‘enquire into the financial needs of University education in the United 
Kingdom and to advise the Government as to the application of any grant 
made by Parliament to meet them.’12
 
11.3 In effect, the UGC was fundamental to upholding the principle of university 
autonomy: although it could give general guidance on how it thought the 
university system should evolve, it oversaw an undemanding accountability 
process (over a five year planning cycle) and explicitly rejected the view that it 
                                                 
9 Richards H., (1997) The collision of two worlds, Times Higher Education, 5 December 1997 
10 Tapper T. & Salter B., (2002) Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 11  
11 ‘Governance’ refers to “the formal and informal exercise of authority under laws, policies and 
rules 
that articulate the rights and responsibilities of various actors, including the rules by which they 
interact” (Hirsch, Werner Z. Weber, Luc E. (eds) (2001) Governance in Higher Education. The 
University in a State of Flux)  
12 Berdahl RO. (1959) British Universitees and the State, London: Cambridge University Press, 
p58 
 38
had the authority to intervene in the affairs of individual institutions.13 The 
concept of the UGC was to form a buffer between individual universities and the 
Government to prevent political influence on the funding of individual 
universities.14
 
11.4 In 1964 the UGC left the auspices of HM Treasury for the then Department 
of Education and Science. Arguably this period marks the emergence of formal 
recognition (and to a degree acceptance) that higher education had an important 
function within society beyond its traditional roles in teaching and research.15
 
11.5 What followed was something of a quickening in the pace of change away 
from HEI autonomy. 1972 to 1977 was the last period during which university 
funding was issued on a quinquennium basis; in 1981 the UGC was ‘forced’ by 
government to administer cuts of 17 per cent over following three years.16 
 
11.6 It was 1988 Education Reform Act17 that gave rise to the funding council 
model of governance in higher education in the UK. The Act replaced the non-
statutory UGC with the statutory Universities Funding Council, and crucially, 
expressly prevented direct interference by the then Secretary of State with the 
activities of individual HEIs18: ‘the conditions subject to which grants are made by 
                                                 
13 Tapper T. & Salter B. (2002) Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 11: September
14 The term buffer was introduced in the Haldane Report (1918). Report of the Machinery of 
Government Committee under the chairmanship of Viscount Haldane of Cloan. London: HMSO.  
The report stated that decisions about what to spend research funds on should be made by 
researchers rather than politicians.  This view was partially rescinded with The Rothschild Report 
(1971). A Framework for Government Research and Development. London: HMSO, which called 
for some government control in respect of research funding. 
15 Tapper T. & Salter B. (2002) Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 11
16 Richards H. (1997) ‘The collision of two worlds’, Times Higher Education, 5 December 1997 
17 Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 c.40 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/40/contents) 
18 Under the Act the Secretary of State for Education was the given power to direct funding 
councils though opposition in both Houses of Parliament ensured key elements of autonomy were 
retained e.g. ensuring that the Secretary of State would have to take ‘directions’ from Parliament, 
give the Universities Funding Council the right to advise him, not discourage the Universities 
Funding Council from allowing universities to raise external funds and protect academics' right to 
question and test the received wisdom behind the direction. 
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the Secretary of State to either of the funding councils shall not relate to the 
making of grants or other payments by the Council to any specified institution.’19
 
11.7 In practice the subsequent 1992 Further and Higher Education Act20 might 
well have removed this restriction were it not for the intervention of the House of 
Lords.21 What the 1992 Act did mark was a seismic shift in the make-up, 
structure and administration of higher education in the UK. In addition to the 
creation of 35 ‘new’ universities the Act also facilitated the merging of the then 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council and the Universities Funding Council 
to funding councils delineated on a national basis. The 1992 Act also clarified two 
key areas: firstly, the formal location of policy direction, and secondly the lines of 
institutional accountability.22
 
Higher education autonomy and accountability in Wales 
 
11.8 Since the 1992 Act, the constitutional context created by the Government of 
Wales Act 1998 and more latterly, the Government of Wales Act 2006, has 
allowed the Welsh Assembly Government to play a primary role in shaping and 
conditioning the higher education sector in Wales. Policy priorities are normally 
initiated by the incumbent Minister23, though in practice exogenous factors - such 
as policy changes at the UK government level - may also provide the ‘trigger’.   
 
11.9 In generating a strategic plan the Assembly will - through a formal 
consultation process - draw upon the views of a wider higher education ‘policy 
network’.24 A key contributor will be Higher Education Funding Council for Wales 
                                                 
19 Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 s134(7) 
20 Further and Higher Education Act 1992 
21 Hansard, 1991, 21 November  
22 Tapper T. & Salter B. (2002) Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 11
23 Within the Department for Children Education Lifelong Learning and Skills (DCELLS), or its 
forerunners. 
24 A term used by Tapper T. & Salter B. (2002) in Understanding Governance and Policy Change 
in British Higher Education OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 11
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(HEFCW) which, since the 1992 Act, performs the role of directly funding and 
overseeing accountability within the higher education sector, but also provides 
advice and guidance on the sector to the Assembly. Other contributors include 
the HEIs, other Assembly departments (like Health),25 sponsored bodies like the 
relevant Audit Committee, other organisations such as higher education 
representative bodies (e.g. Committee of University Chairs, Universities UK and 
its Welsh ‘arm’, Higher Education Wales), the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA), the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) and many 
others. Figure 1 presents the linkages between the Welsh Assembly, HEFCW, 
other agencies/representative bodies and the HEIs. 
 
Figure 1: Higher Education Policy Network 
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11.10 Following the 2006 Government of Wales Act, HEFCW became an 
Assembly Government Sponsored Body with the specific mission to: ‘promote 
                                                 
25 Health, for example, because of the responsibility for the higher education of doctors, dentists 
and other health professionals 
26 In Clark T. (2006) OECD Thematic review of Tertiary Education Country Report: United 
Kingdom London: DFES, p65 
 41
internationally excellent higher education in Wales, for the benefit of individuals, 
society and the economy, in Wales and more widely’.27 28
 
11.11 Essentially, the strategic aims of HEFCW are to: 
• Widen participation and access in support of social inclusion and 
economic up-skilling; 
• Deliver the highest quality learning and related support for students; 
• Deliver improved research performance to underpin the knowledge 
economy and cultural and social renewal;  
• Deliver more productive relationships between HEIs and other 
stakeholders in Wales; 
• Deliver high quality new teachers; 
• Emphasise  reconfiguration, collaboration, and other measures to sustain 
improved performance of HEIs and the higher education system as a 
whole; 
• Ensure HEFCW operates as an effective public sector body.29 
 
11.12 Within the context of the ‘For Our Future’ change agenda, these aims 
illustrate that much hinges on HEFCW’s role as an intermediary between the 
Assembly and the higher education sector and its willingness to drive forward 
delivery of Government priority objectives. Particularly crucial are the formal and 
informal links between HEFCW and the Welsh Assembly Government. 
 
11.13 In terms of formal links, each year HEFCW receives a remit letter from the 
Assembly Government Minister outlining the priority areas and funding for higher 
education over the following year. HEFCW then works with universities in Wales 
to help ensure that the allocated funding - the annual 'block' grants to higher 
                                                 
27 http://www.hefcw.ac.uk/about_us/our_responsibilities/vision_mission.aspx
28 It should be noted that not all Higher Education areas have been devolved: Wales continues to work on an 
England and Wales or UK-wide basis in areas such as the annual survey of student satisfaction, 
assessments of the quality of research in higher education and applying to university 
29 http://www.hefcw.ac.uk/about_us/our_responsibilities/vision_mission.aspx
 42
education institutions based on enrolments and research performance, as well as 
smaller amounts to meet specific strategies - is spent:  
 
• ‘in accordance with their own missions and aims; 
• in a way which helps achieve the objectives for higher education in Wales 
outlined by the Welsh Assembly Government; 
• effectively so that public funds can be accounted for.’30 
 
11.14 In essence therefore HEFCW’s main role is to convert guidance from the 
Welsh Assembly Government into practical arrangements for allocating funds. 
The degree of prescription within this role is a crucial factor in determining the 
level of HEI autonomy and moreover, provides for possible tensions between the 
Assembly and the higher education sector.  
 
Tensions around Higher Education Autonomy in Wales 
 
Assembly Priorities 
 
11.15 The findings of the Merfyn Jones Review (2008)31 and the subsequent 
publication of ‘For our Future: A 21st Century Higher Education Strategy and 
Action Plan for Wales’ sharpened the focus on issues of higher education 
autonomy in Wales. ‘For Our Future’ made clear the Welsh Assembly 
Government’s intentions to ‘make higher education more open, accessible and 
responsive to regional and national need’ and ‘in so doing higher education will 
enhance its contribution to social justice and economic performance.’32
 
                                                 
30 http://www.hefcw.ac.uk/ 
31  Review of Higher Education in Wales Phase 1: Student Finance Arrangements  
 Report from the Chair of the Task and Finish Group, Professor R. Merfyn Jones  October 2008, 
p1 
32 http://wales.gov.uk/docs//dfm/minutes/cabinet/100105highereducationstrategy1en.doc , p16 
 43
11.16 In the 2010/2011 remit letter to HEFCW the Minister draws upon the 
recommendations of ‘For our Future’ to outline Welsh Assembly Government’s 
expectations in relation to funding, namely that HEFCW should:33
• ‘Instigate a step change in its approach to funding’; 
• Undertake a ‘comprehensive review and re-structuring of existing funding 
streams from 2010-11’; 
• ‘Ensure greater use of core funding to drive forward strategic goals’; 
• Progressively implement a new Strategic Implementation Fund from 
2010/11 to replace the Reaching Higher Fund; 
• Ensure that all planned capital developments are demonstrably aligned 
with ‘For Our Future’; 
• Introduce an integrated approach to a ‘regional planning and delivery 
system for HE’ in Wales; 
• Guide institutions to match national priorities for Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) and Modern Language subjects. 
  
11.17 The subsequent ‘circular’ sent by HEFCW to HEIs in Wales presents the 
funding priorities together with associated measures and targets. 34 In this 
respect, the recent (W10/37HE) circular identifies that significant action is 
needed to achieve the target on Reconfiguration and Collaboration35 though 
notably, work was still needed at the time of writing to define appropriate funding 
levers in order to finalise proposals. 
 
11.18 More notable perhaps is that the HEFCW remit letters (from the Assembly) 
since 2004-05 reveal frequent coverage of Reconfiguration and Collaboration 
agenda. For example, in 2004-05 remit letter the then Minister for Education and 
Lifelong Learning stated:  
                                                 
33 Higher Education Funding Council for Wales Remit Letter 2010/11 sent by Leighton Andrews AM 10 
March 2010 http://www.hefcw.ac.uk/documents/about_he_in_wales/wag_priorities_and_policies/2010-
11%20remit%20letter.pdf
34 Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (November 2010) Initial proposals for changing the funding 
system for higher education in Wales, W10/37HE 
35 Measure 11: At least 75% of the Welsh higher education institutions will have an annual income in excess 
of the UK median (36% in 2008/09), with no institution to be in the lower quartile by 2012/13 (4 in 2008/09) 
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 ‘I continue to place prime importance on the reconfiguration of the sector. 
This is at the centre of our “something for something” approach to funding. 
The Council’s focus for the year should be to work with institutions to 
support and deliver their collaboration and merger plans, and to work 
closely with those institutions without concrete plans, in order to develop 
firm proposals.’36  
 
11.19 While all this might be expected in relation to an ongoing policy, it does 
hint at questions around the speed at which reforms are being implemented by 
the HEIs. 
 
11.20 This issue was taken up by the Welsh Audit Office (2009).37 They 
considered progress made towards achieving the Assembly Government’s policy 
objectives for higher education through collaborative projects. Fundamentally, the 
report recognises that Wales has a number of small HEIs offering overlapping 
provision. It further notes that in 2002, with the aim of reducing costs and 
achieving critical mass in teaching and research capacity, the Welsh Assembly 
Government established a Reconfiguration and Collaboration Fund, available for 
Welsh HEIs to apply for in support of collaboration projects.   
 
11.21 Though the Audit report presented some evidence of good progress on 
targets associated with the Collaboration Fund, it also identified clear room for 
improvement (for example, in relation to increased collaboration (or full merger) 
between the University of Glamorgan, University of Newport and University 
Wales Institute Cardiff). 
 
                                                 
36 Higher Education Funding Council for Wales Remit Letter 2004-05 
http://www.hefcw.ac.uk/documents/about_he_in_wales/wag_priorities_and_policies/Remit%20Let
ter%202004_05.PDF
37 Wales Audit Office (January 2009) Collaboration Between Higher Education Institutions, Report 
presented by the Auditor General to the National Assembly on 14 January 2009 Cardiff: WAO 
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11.22 The review did however identify factors that formed barriers to HEI 
collaboration or merger, including: 
• Not all institutions shared the Assembly Government’s view that increased 
collaboration was necessary to remain competitive; 
• Higher than expected levels of mistrust and competition among some 
HEIs institutions; 
• Other factors like institutional history, potential impact on the locality and 
job losses. 
 
11.23 Despite (or perhaps, in part, because of) these factors, the Assembly 
Minister recently stated that HEIs in Wales would either ’adapt or die’. In 
particular he noted that:  
 
’Successive evidence points to the need for fewer institutions with greater 
critical mass building on respective strengths rather than wasting 
resources competing with neighbours. Wales has been held back for 
years by too many institutions which are too small to cut a mark 
internationally, too small to operate effectively and efficiently and too small 
to respond to the growing pressure of international competition.’ 38   
 
11.24 Making clear his frustration with the pace of change, the Minister further 
forewarned that: ’There will be fewer higher education institutions in Wales by 
2013 (.....).’39
 
Economic Context 
 
11.25 Of course, the Minister’s comments (and many of the existing Assembly 
policy priorities) are rooted in the wider current context of economic austerity. 
                                                 
38 Speech by Leighton Andrews AM to the Institute of Welsh Affairs, Carmarthen, 4 December 
2010 (http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/education-news/2010/12/04/mergers-pay-for-fees-deal-
91466-27765439/) 
39 ibid 
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Though the Welsh Assembly Government has responded to the Browne 
Review40, as well as wider UK Government austerity measures, the full 
implications for higher education in Wales are as yet unknown. What is known is 
that such measures will continue to focus attention on the efficiency by which the 
sector in Wales operates.  
 
11.26 In this regard a recent report by PricewaterhouseCoopers on the costs of 
education in Wales also raised doubts about the efficiency of current 
arrangements. The report identified a number of areas (and actions) where 
potential savings might be made in higher education in Wales. The 
recommendations focused, in particular, on where reducing support costs such 
as back office costs, access and assessment and service management and 
administration.41 Ten ‘hypotheses’ falling under two broad themes were identified 
- with varying applicability to higher education specifically - including:42
 
• ‘Simplify governance structure’ (reducing the demands on the system as 
result of excessive policy development, administration requirements and 
performance monitoring): 
o Reduce and simplify the number of specific grants requiring individual 
management and administration; 
o Prioritise policy objectives based on value and achievability; 
o Rationalise inspection and performance management. 
• ‘Standardise and Share Provision’ (more aligned and collaborative ways of 
working): 
o All non-departmental public bodies use a single back office 
function; 
                                                 
40 The ‘Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance’ chaired by Lord 
Browne of Madingley considered the future direction of higher education funding in England. The 
findings, published on 12 October 2010, recommended wide-ranging changes to the system of 
university funding, in particular removing the cap on the level of fees that universities can charge, 
and increasing the income level at which graduates must begin to pay back their loans to £21,000 
41 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) Review of the cost of administering the education system in 
Wales – Phase 1 
42 Ibid, p5 
 47
o Standardise access, assessment and admissions processes;  
o Simplify, standardise or share the support to Higher Education 
(reconfiguring the delivery of support services between faculties 
within institutions); 
o Converging on leading practice in common support functions 
(increase the pace of improvement by developing a common 
measure of leading practice for each support function and setting a 
presumption that each organisation will self-assess, establish the 
performance gap and address it). 43 
 
11.27 Noticeably PricewaterhouseCoopers claimed that ‘there is an appetite for 
reducing the number of institutions although political difficulties mean that this is 
not a fast route for shifting cost.’44
 
11.28 The report further points to a lack of trust as underpinning the need for 
control: for example, comments from respondents such as: ‘If I don’t trust 
providers to deliver I will increasingly use funding levers and regulation to force a 
solution’.  
 
11.29 Acknowledging the potential difficulties, PricewaterhouseCoopers describe 
the need to build the case for change. This will likely include blunt acceptance 
from stakeholders that things cannot continue the way they have done, but also 
emphasise a way forward based around a set of agreed principles presented in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid, p6 
44 ibid 
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Figure 2: Enabling factors  
¾ A national deal: to be politically acceptable across the system, each constituent 
organisation must play a part with an equal focus on reducing the costs of governance 
and reconfiguring provision. 
¾ A national presumption to give direction and pace: the local appetite for change is 
building, but to cut through resistance and to deliver efficiently the sector should work 
towards a presumed model and use commonly developed tools and methods to 
deliver it. 
¾ Adopt or amend: allow for local configuration and progressive adjustment of the 
model to best accommodate local circumstances and workable coalitions of 
stakeholders while setting an expectation of challenge and pace. 
¾ A new trust across the system: a new ability to deliver through others, replacing line 
management, enforcement and control mechanisms with dialogue, transparency and 
an acceptance of a mutual responsibility to deliver. 
Source: PricewaterhouseCooopers (2010)45
 
Role of HEFCW 
 
11.30 Another potential fault line comes in the link between the Assembly and 
the Welsh HEIs. A report by the Assembly Government surveyed views on 
HEFCW’s position between the Welsh Assembly Government (to whom it is 
accountable), and the higher education sector (whom it funds). Many 
respondents saw the need to balance views as potentially ‘uncomfortable’.46  
 
11.31 In the report HEFCW was variously described as a ‘buffer’ or ‘translatory 
body’, or a body with a ‘triangular’ relationship with other stakeholders. It follows 
that respondents thought there was ‘a need for greater clarity and understanding 
of each other’s roles and responsibilities.’ Moreover, HEIs and Welsh Assembly 
                                                 
45 Ibid, p7 
46 Welsh Assembly Government (2009) Report on the Citizen-Centred Governance Review of the 
Higher Education  Funding Council for Wales, Performance and Governance, p12 
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Government expressed a desire for ‘further transparency about HEFCW’s 
decision-making, and the rationale behind decisions.’47   
 
11.32 In terms of value for money, it was noted that compared to its larger 
counterparts in England and Scotland, ‘HEFCW was unable to benefit from 
economies of scale and so would appear to be relatively more expensive’.48
 
11.33 Despite this there was ‘a huge amount of respect’ for HEFCW’s role from 
within the higher education sector, which had ‘good day to day communications’ 
with HEFCW.49 The concerns raised were not all one way either: a particular 
problem in the system was perceived to be the delay in HEFCW’s receiving its 
Remit Letter from DCELLS, which impacted on timeliness of HEFCW’s preparing 
its corporate and operational plans.  
 
11.34 More generally, the literature points to good levels of satisfaction with 
HEFCW’s performance. Despite the concerns described previously in this review, 
the Welsh Audit Office (2009) report into the Reconfiguration and Collaboration 
Fund did state that HEFCW ‘has generally managed the ….Fund effectively’ and 
been ‘helpful in providing informal advice’ and ‘operated transparent criteria’.50    
 
11.35 HEFCW has also showed itself to be responsive including in making – 
subsequent to the Welsh Audit Office’s recommendation for improved working 
with HEIs - a ‘major overhaul of its approaches for strategic engagement with the 
institutions, including proposals to establish a “governors tool kit”’.51  
 
                                                 
47 Ibid, p13-18 
48 ibid, p5 
49 Ibid, p18 
50 Wales Audit Office (2009) Collaboration Between Higher Education Institutions, Report 
presented by the Auditor General to the National Assembly on 14 January 2009 Cardiff: WAO , 
p10 
51  Response to the report of the National Assembly Audit Committee's report on Collaboration 
between Higher Education Institutions: Committee Report (3) 05-09 
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11.36 Findings from the recent stakeholder survey on the effectiveness of 
HEFCW also pointed to good overall performance.52 However, the survey also 
pointed to areas where potential improvements could be made, including: 
• Working more closely with HEIs, and particularly more direct (one to one) 
contact which improves understanding and builds trust;53 
• Reducing micro-management, HEIs stating that detailed strategies should 
not be required when bidding for relatively small pots of money; 
• Continuing to improve electronic communication; 
• Improving representation of the sector to the Welsh Assembly 
Government; 
• Providing more detail on support and policies for reconfiguration and 
collaboration. 
 
Legal Context 
 
11.37 The Welsh Assembly Government’s frustrations in its inability to fully 
shape higher education in Wales must also be considered in the wider legal, 
administrative and commercial context of the higher education sector in Wales.  
HEIs in Wales are independent bodies whose autonomy is protected under the 
1992 Act. But they are also organisations that receive funding from many 
sources including: tuition fees; research grants and contracts, their own 
commercial activity (e.g. consultancy, employer training, spin off companies) and 
assets (e.g. residences & catering), donations and endowments.54 Indeed the 
autonomy paradox here is that increasing calls for accountability are coming at a 
time when HEIs in Wales will receive less funding from the public purse.   
 
                                                 
52 Strategic Marketing, Stakeholder Survey for HE and FE Institutions 2007, Higher Education 
Funding Council Wales (HEFCW), April 2008 
53 Which is somewhat ironic since it has been claimed by Tapper and Salter (2002, p9) that the 
pre-1964 approach to funding HEIs in the UK relied as much on the basis of personal social 
contacts as of bureaucratic procedures 
54 Clark T. (2006) OECD Thematic Review of Tertiary Education Country Report: United 
Kingdom, Department for Education and Skills, Research Report RR767, London: OECD, p16 
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12. Higher Education Autonomy and Accountability in England 
and Scotland  
 
12.1 A history of autonomy in higher education forms the cultural backdrop to the 
higher education sector in other countries of the UK. Similarity in structural 
processes around the use of the funding council model also means that much 
might be learnt in Wales by looking at the perceived strengths, weaknesses and 
tensions in the systems in England and Scotland.55   
 
Accountability and the funding council model in England 
 
12.2 The English higher education sector is by far the largest of the UK sectors. 
The Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) provides the 
intermediary role between the UK government and HEIs. HEFCE is a non-
departmental public body. This means that although it works within the a policy 
framework set by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills it is 
not part of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
 
12.3 HEFCE has five core strategic aims: 
• Enhancing excellence in research; 
• Enhancing excellence in learning and teaching; 
• Enhancing the contribution of HE to the economy and society; 
• Widening participation and access; 
• Employer engagement and skills.56 
 
12.4 To meet these aims in 2010/11 HEFCE will: 
                                                 
55 As a result of the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act the Funding Council models in 
England, Scotland and Wales are broadly similar, though with some notable differences.  The 
situation in Northern Ireland is complicated by the history of the Peace Process and currently the 
UK Department for Employment and Learning provides funding directly to HEIs.  
56 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/aboutus/history/GuidetoHEFCE.pdf 
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• Distribute £7.4billion to 130 universities and 123 further educations 
colleges delivering HE for higher education teaching, research and related 
activities;  
• Fund programmes to support the development of higher education; 
• Monitor the financial and managerial health of universities and colleges;  
• Provide guidance based upon research findings about ‘what works well’ 
and fund national co-ordination teams to support HEIs on specific 
developments widening participation of under-represented groups.57 
 
12.5 The Government decides the total amount of funds to be distributed each 
year. In practice HEIs receive most of their HEFCE funding as a ‘block grant’ and 
then choose how allocate funds across teaching, research and other functions. 
Like the situation in Wales, there are, however, some restrictions placed by 
HEFCE on how funding allotted to HEIs for special initiatives is spent. 
 
12.6 HEFCE works in partnership with other organisations and agencies to fulfill 
other functions of control. The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
carries out on behalf of HEFCE the role of assessing standards in quality of 
teaching and learning. Together with the other UK funding bodies, HEFCE also 
periodically assesses the quality of research in higher education. This will 
continue under the new Research Excellence Framework. 
 
12.7 HEFCE provides informed advice to Government on the funding needs and 
development of higher education. By drawing on the views of HEIs as well as 
their own commissioned research HEFCE can help shape Government policy 
development. It also ‘acts as an advocate for universities and colleges’ in relation 
to Government plans and helps HEIs respond to Government priorities for higher 
education 58  
 
 
                                                 
57 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/aboutus 
58 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/aboutus/history/GuidetoHEFCE.pdf 
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Strengths of HEFCE and funding council model in England 
 
12.8 A review - undertaken before the 2010 General Election - of key HE 
stakeholders in England pointed to overall satisfaction with the work of HEFCE 
(and implicitly the funding council model in England). In particular: 
 
• The then UK Government valued HEFCE for its expertise in developing 
detailed policy and in its efficient administration of public funding in higher 
education.  In particular ‘the Council is perceived to be professional, expert in 
discharging its functions and responsive to the development of public 
policy’;59 
• HEFCE was also thought to provide the Government with real insight into the 
sector not available from other sources; 
• Government also valued the responsiveness of HEFCE to change, citing the 
Economic Challenge Investment Fund (ECIF) which demonstrated HEFCE’s 
ability to respond rapidly to a high priority requirement; 
• Both Government and HEIs valued the varied role played by HEFCE as a 
‘policy broker, funder and proportionate regulator’60.  It is seen as ‘both 
interlocutor and agent, broker and policy manager, investor and regulator’;61 
• HEIs viewed HEFCE as ‘cheap, effective, stable.’62 For 2008-09 HEFCE’s 
running costs were 0.27% of total expenditure, lower than either the Scottish 
(0.54%) or Welsh (0.66%) equivalents.63 Efficiency has been improved with 
the use of ‘strategic response teams’ - to deal with the implications of new 
policy development – and the use of secondments (though more could be 
done here);64 
 
                                                 
59 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
HEFCE (Final Report), March, page 6 
60 Ibid, p6 
61 Ibid, p7 
62 Ibid, p8 
63 Ibid, p12 
64 Ibid, p8 
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• HEIs also saw HEFCE as ‘sector sensitive’.65  In particular, the ‘reflective and 
self-critical’ approach adopted by HEFCE is perceived as a strength, allowing 
the Council to operate flexibly, to ‘improve performance or adjust its 
processes’ where appropriate.66 It undertakes a range of improvement and 
benchmarking activities and in 2008 achieved the European Foundation for 
Quality Management (EFQM) accreditation. Stakeholder perceptions are also 
seen by HEFCE as central to their overall effectiveness.  In 2008 three 
institutional teams were set up specifically in relation to build and review links 
with HEIs;67 
• HEIs also stated that it was important for HEFCE to be ‘respected’ by HEIs 
and to work in partnership with them: HEFCE was found to be performing well 
on these measures;68 
• Non-HEI stakeholders thought HEFCE ‘approachable’ and ‘effective’ and 
commented that their relationship with HEFCE has improved since 2005. 
Crucial was the feeling that ‘familiarity breeds favourability’ because other 
agencies over time come to learn and understand HEFCE’s role;69 
• The effective management of stakeholder relationships has generally 
developed to a high degree. Both HEIs and Government cited the handling of 
the stakeholder consultation in the development of proposals for the 
Research Excellence Framework (REF) as being particularly effective;70  
• Overall, Government and HEIs are pleased with the role and effectiveness of 
HEFCE ‘as funder, market regulator and a catalyst for improvement.’71 
• HEFCE oversees a ‘a successful and thriving’ HE sector in England. Though 
not solely responsible for this success, HEFCE is a ‘key enabler and could 
                                                 
65 Ibid, p8 
66 Ibid, p7 
67 ibid 
68 Ipsos MORI (2008) 2007 Survey of Communications and Relations between HEFCE and 
Universities and Colleges, Higher Education Funding Council for England 
69 Ipsos MORI (2009) Survey of Communications and Relations between HEFCE and its Key 
Non-HEI Stakeholders and Staff, Higher Education Funding Council for England, 25 September 
2009 
70 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
HEFCE (Final Report), March. 
71 Ibid, p7 
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equally be a hindrance were it to lack the necessary competence and sensitivity 
to understand how HEIs and the sector actually work.’72 
 
Weaknesses of HEFCE and the funding council model in England  
 
12.9 Recent findings also suggest room for improvement in HEFCE’s 
performance in relation to: 
 
• Mitigating the complexity around the teaching funding model (the complexity 
of the model means it is increasingly less well understood outside of the 
Council itself). 
• The need to continue to improve the quality and consistency of interaction via 
its Institutional and Assurance teams; 
• The balance of support provided by HEFCE in its engagement with higher risk 
HEIs. The perception has been one of inappropriately disproportional focus 
on ‘poorer performing’ HEIs at the expense of those not at risk (especially in 
times of economic austerity). 73 
 
12.10 The wider UK literature also points to some weaknesses in the funding 
council approach more generally. Tapper and Salter (2002) have been 
particularly critical of funding council based models: ‘The funding council 
quangos are essentially managerial bodies that work within the parameters 
established by government. Similarly, whilst the universities may formally retain 
their corporate independence, they have little choice but to work within the 
framework established by the funding councils.’74
 
                                                 
72 Ibid, p8 
73 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
HEFCE (Final Report), March, p12 
74 Tapper T. & Salter B. (2002) Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 11: September Page 12 
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12.11 They further contend that the funding council system is an ‘inherently 
instable model of governance’75 due to tensions around: 
• The potential for disagreement on how policy priorities should be achieved 
(how tax revenue is spent in higher education); 
• The varying contexts and approaches adopted by each national council in 
respect of the differing policy context across the devolved Government (for 
example student support arrangements in England are different to those in 
Wales); 
• Competition amongst HEIs for scarce funding council revenue; 
• Internal competition between academics for university budgets and how HEIs 
balance the demands of academics with their accountability to the funding 
council.76 
 
12.12 In these respects Evans (2010) speaks of the two fault lines. The first is at 
the ‘junction between the institution and state.’ The second is within the institution 
itself, which, he contends, because of their fragmented nature, questions the 
whole notion of viewing HEIs as functioning autonomous and internally united 
entities.77
  
12.13 More generally, the diversity of HEI activities and specialisms make control 
difficult (and can lead to conflicting priorities; for example, encouraging a focus 
on STEM subjects within a HEI that is capable of producing world class research 
but not in STEM subjects).78
 
12.14 All this is not helped by remit letter from the Secretary of State in England 
which has become longer over the years and offers ‘increasingly more detailed 
guidance on both what policy directions the Government want the Funding 
                                                 
75 Ibid, p12 
76 Ibid, p13 
77 Evans G.R. (2010) University autonomy: two fault lines, Higher Education Review, Vol 42, No 
3, 2010 
78  Tapper T. & Salter B., Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education, Page 22 
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Council to follow and, more frequently of late, recommendations on how they 
should be achieved.’79
 
12.15 Indeed the complexity of higher education and the breadth of its activities 
mean that many different bodies may have the right to make regulations and 
other bureaucratic demands on institutions (e.g. Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA), the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA)). 
Clark (2006) identifies a particular disadvantage of the separate Funding Bodies 
is that both the different arms of Government and the Funding Bodies may 
impose requirements on universities and colleges which may lead to excessive 
bureaucracy.80
 
12.16 However, Clark (2006) accepts that the UK Government has had some 
success in recent times with parallel approaches aimed reducing the burden of 
externally imposed bureaucracy on public institutions. In this way the Better 
Regulation Task Force oversaw an estimated 25% reduction in the cost of 
bureaucracy for English universities in the four years to 2004. Its successor the 
Higher Education Regulation Review Group (HERRG) has also been praised by 
Government for its success in ‘changing the sector’s attitudes and approaches to 
regulation’ leading to the agreement of a higher education Concordat on quality 
assurance and data collection.81 This paved the way for changes in 2008 
towards a more self-regulatory system with a more light touch approach from 
government.82
 
12.17 The search for control of policy direction without destroying the legacy of 
institutional autonomy has led towards a policy network approach bringing 
                                                 
79 Ibid, p10 
80 Clark T. (2006) OECD Thematic Review of Tertiary Education Country Report: United 
Kingdom, Department for Education and Skills, Research Report RR767, London: OECD 
81 The Government’s response to Final Report of Steve Bundred Chair of the Higher Education 
Regulation Review Group (HERRG) (2006), page 1 
82 Essentially a senior civil servant within the Department for Innovation Universities and Skills 
with a clear responsibility to champion better regulation 
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together powerful groups of key stakeholders who shape policy development and 
implementation.83
 
12.18 At one level this is somewhat contradictory: a funding council central 
function is to find the ways and means of delivering policy goals, yet it is a role 
which it can only accomplish with critical inputs from individual academics and 
their universities (and other stakeholders).   
 
12.19 Other findings also acknowledge the requirement of HEFCE (and funding 
councils generally) to face ‘more than two ways at the same time.’ Though 
founded on a statutory basis HEFCE’s effectiveness is dependent on working 
‘within a framework of informed consent with both the Sector and Government.’84
 
12.20 Tapper and Salter (2002) contend that actually the role of the policy 
network might be something of a mirage since it is the government that holds the 
‘political and bureaucratic muscle’ and that what in practice occurs is an 
‘orchestrated interchange of ideas between unequal partners’. In this respect 
might policy networks – orchestrated by funding councils - actually provided 
additional control to Government through the ‘divide and conquer’ rule?85  
 
Issues of accountability in Scotland 
 
12.21 Higher education in Scotland is a devolved matter. Since devolution the 
Scottish Parliament has used its powers to abolish up-front tuition fees, to 
provide for the payment of fees post-graduation by those earning above a 
threshold, and to introduce a unique system of means-tested grants.  
 
                                                 
83 Tapper T. & Salter B., Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education 
83 Ibid 
84 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
HEFCE (Final Report), March, p7 
85 Tapper T. & Salter B., Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education, p 29-30 
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12.22 The structure of HE sector administration and accountability broadly 
resembles that in England and Wales, though with notable differences.86 Formed 
in 2005 out of the merger of the previously delineated further and higher 
education funding councils the Scottish Funding Council (SFC)87 is the national, 
strategic body that is responsible for funding teaching and learning provision, 
research and other activities in Scotland. The SFC oversees around £1.7 billion 
worth of funding to the 43 colleges and 20 HEIs in Scotland.88
 
12.23 In 2007 the Scottish government presented the ‘New Horizons’ report into 
the future of higher education in Scotland. The report made explicit reference to 
the Scottish Government’s desire for allocated funding to higher education to be 
used in ways that best support achievement of national level Strategic objectives 
and outcomes. The report presents a number of challenges set by government to 
universities and vice versa.  These are presented in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: Challenges in New Horizons  
Challenges from the Scottish Government: 
1. Scottish universities must demonstrate that they use the funds they receive from the 
Scottish Government to support activities which are well aligned with the Scottish 
Government’s Purpose, its economic and skills strategies and its other policy frameworks; 
2. Learning provision in universities must become more flexible (if it is to respond to the 
changing needs of students) and more capable of being delivered by closer and differing 
institutional collaborations and structures; 
3. Universities must contribute more directly to Scotland having a world-class knowledge 
economy by embedding a culture of engagement between themselves and the Scottish 
micro, small and medium sized business base. 
 
Challenges from Universities Scotland: 
1. By 2028 Scotland must be in the top quartile of OECD countries for percentage of GDP 
                                                 
86 Scottish Government (2008) New Horizons: responding to the challenges of the 21st century: 
The Report of the Joint Future Thinking Taskforce on Universities 
87Scottish Funding Council is the commonly used name of the Scottish Further and Higher 
Education Funding Council 
88 Scottish Funding Council (2010), The 2010 at a glance guide to the Scottish Funding Council. 
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invested in its universities and for national investment in research, development and 
innovation. These are not excessively ambitious targets for a country aspiring to develop 
an advanced knowledge-based economy, but currently Scotland falls far short of them. 
Progress towards achieving them needs to start now; 
2. In order to meet the future labour market needs of an advanced knowledge-based 
economy, as a minimum Scotland must aim to be in the top quartile internationally for its 
higher education participation rate and must substantially increase postgraduate taught 
and research student numbers; 
3. The new General Fund for Universities funding stream must deliver sustainable funding for 
all mainstream university activities, including learning and teaching, research, knowledge 
exchange and the renewal of infrastructure; and the Horizon Fund for Universities funding 
stream must provide the resources necessary to support strategic change and non-
standard funding needs and to fund new initiatives and projects, including investment in 
capacity building. 
Source: Scottish Government, New Horizons Report89
 
12.24 In meeting these challenges ‘New Horizons’ proposes ‘a new relationship 
between the Scottish Government and Scotland’s universities.’90 The starting 
point will be recognition of the university sector ‘as a sector of the economy in its 
own right.’91
 
12.25 The Scottish Government has sought to encourage debate – rather than 
prescribe a solution – about the new arrangements. It did this by presenting 
seven models – shown in Figure 4 -illustrating how the relationship between the 
Scottish Government, the Scottish Funding Council and Scotland’s universities 
might be redrawn.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Scottish Government (2008) New Horizons: responding to the challenges of the 21st century: 
The Report of the Joint Future Thinking Taskforce on Universities, p3 
90 Ibid, p9 
91 ibid 
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Figure 4: Options for New Arrangements 
 
Model Description 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Status Quo No change to the present 
relationships. 
Stability from 
continuation 
Escalating costs, 
Scottish HEls  less 
competitive 
internationally 
Incentivised/ 
Progressive 
As status quo but Government 
sets new direction aligned to 
the Government’s Purpose 
Make clear and agreed 
statement that links HE 
to sustainable 
economic growth in key 
industry sectors  
Challenge to existing 
mindset e.g. asks that 
more room is made for  
research with economic 
application 
Highly 
Directive 
Furthers the Progressive 
model to point where all 
subjects are set by the 
Government and all research 
funding is based on 
competition. 
Government/SFC take 
on the role the public 
already perceives them 
to be doing 
Emphasis on 
Government choice 
places substantial 
pressure on 
Government obtaining 
high quality labour 
market projections. 
Covenant HEIs are given the funding 
with high level objectives and 
they must manage resources 
to meet outcomes targets.  HE 
Principal Officers replace SFC. 
Targets are based on 
negotiations. 
More equal negotiating 
position based on HEI 
understanding of their 
own strengths and 
future capacity 
Government monitors 
progress against 
targets but what 
happens if outcomes 
are not met? 
 
Self-
Differentiating 
Where competition on teaching 
is introduced through a 
Teaching Assessment 
Exercise 
Generates dynamism in 
teaching in the sector.  
Sector already does 
this through the RAE. 
Winners but also losers 
Centrally 
Differentiated 
Target high level of funds 
towards one HEI to achieve 
top 20 (world) status. 
Other HEIs receive funds 
directed towards meeting skills 
and applied 
research needs. 
Evidence of the 
economic benefits 
associated with a top 
twenty HEI 
Is this legal? 
Could agreement be 
reached on the ‘one 
HEI?’ 
Threshold Where the Government 
purchases a fixed number of 
places at Scottish HEIs with 
the market becoming 
unregulated beyond that. 
Would make costs 
manageable for 
Government. 
Government controls 
number of places for 
Scots. 
Questionable under EU 
laws on student 
support? 
What about 
research?92
Source: adapted from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/82254/0058120.pdf 
 
12.26 In practice a hybrid model was agreed based upon: 
                                                 
92The indivisibility of teaching and research is recognised as a defining characteristic of Scottish 
university system 
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 • The ‘adaptive capacity’ of the HE sector in Scotland and the ability of the 
Scottish Government, the Scottish Funding Council and Scotland’s 
universities to support and develop the sector within this parameter;93 
• A ‘something for something’ approach between the Scottish Government and 
universities which is ‘mutually reinforcing, focusing on outcomes as a 
measure of success’;94 
• The notion that incentives are attractive as long as quality and excellence is 
maintained;  
• Entry into university should be flexible with multiple access and exit points; 
• HEIs know their own strengths and capacity and the system should allow 
them to play to these (Self-Differentiating); 
• Diversity is a strength of the HE sector in Scotland as a whole and should 
continue to be emphasised (Self-Differentiating); 
• A focus on outcomes rather than inputs (Covenant).  
 
12.27 Crucial to the success of the ‘New Horizons’ strategy is that HEIs accept 
the challenge of the new arrangements and in particular the strengthened links 
between funding and overarching national goals and priorities. In doing so, the 
Government argues that the overall case for an increasing proportion of 
government funding to HEIs in Scotland will be stronger. This is ‘the crux of the 
“something for something” deal’.95  
 
12.28 Other facilitating measures include the need for:96
• Relaxation in the regulatory framework adopted by the Scottish Funding 
Council and a new ‘lighter touch’ approach adopted to managing the 
relationship with institutions;  
                                                 
93 Scottish Government (2008) New Horizons: responding to the challenges of the 21st century: 
The Report of the Joint Future Thinking Taskforce on Universities, p 24 
94 ibid, p25 
95 ibid,p 27 
96 ibid  
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• Government-HEI consultation through a new Tripartite Advisory Group which 
will be the forum through which the sector offers its views on the new 
arrangements; 
• The Scottish Funding Council to play a central role in implementing key 
strategic initiatives developed in partnership with universities; 
• The Scottish Government’s role in the future to ‘change to be more focused 
on outcomes, aligned to Government policy priorities’;   
• The need for strong governance and leadership within HEIs – and particularly 
from governing bodies - to ensure universities play an active part in this new 
set of relationships; 
• A new set of funding arrangements. In particular, public funding needed to be 
delineated into two new funds:97 
o the General Fund for Universities (GFU) – a pot with fewer restrictions 
and more flexibility with performance judged against Government’s 
high level objectives, outcomes and indicators; 
o Horizon Fund for Universities (HFU) – a pot used to incentivise delivery 
that is aligned to key Government strategies and priorities. 98 
 
12.29 Changes under ‘New Horizons’ will also see a more ‘moderation’ role for 
the Scottish Funding Council (SFC) in ensuring continued coherence of 
provision, focusing some resources on ‘spend-to-save’ initiatives which have 
identifiable and realisable financial benefit, and supporting mergers where the 
relevant HEIs deem it appropriate.99  In particular it is thought the SFC will focus 
on: 100
                                                 
97 SFC indicate that around 90% of funding will be for GFU, 10% for HFU 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/82254/0069175.pdf) 
98 Scottish Government (2008) New Horizons: responding to the challenges of the 21st century: 
The Report of the Joint Future Thinking Taskforce on Universities 
99 Universities Scotland (2010) Towards a Scottish Solution: Universities Scotland’s first 
contribution towards finding a Scottish solution for the sustainable funding of the university sector, 
October 2010 
100 New Horizons: Joint future thinking taskforce on universities The Funding Council’s response 
to the interim report (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/82254/0069175.pdf) 
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• Simplification in the funding system (e.g. a teaching funding formulae based 
on one single student number target rather than 25 categories) and 
monitoring oversight (e.g. work with partners - like Audit Scotland - to reduce 
requirements on HEIs for other information); 
• Funding orientated more towards funding ‘the right provision in the right 
institution’ than previous; 
• A lighter touch on issues of HEI governance, with HEIs running their own 
affairs with more emphasis on the role of the Governing body and less 
internal scrutiny from the SFC; 
• Key strategic initiatives e.g. Horizon Fund; 
• Taking advice from the Tripartite Advisory Group on suitable measures for 
outcomes targets; 
• Identifying and supporting ambition and confidence and encouraging the 
higher education sector in Scotland to ‘think big’. 
 
12.30 Within the context of financial austerity the SFC may also be under 
pressure to reduce their costs to the proportionate benchmark set by HEFCE 
(SFC currently consumes in cost 0.5% of grants given to HEIs compared to 0.2% 
for HEFCE) with the savings passed on in additional resources to HEIs.101  
 
Performance of the SFC 
 
12.31 Since the publishing of ‘New Horizons’ the SFC - as part of its commitment 
to continuous improvement – has undertaken a review of stakeholder views as to 
determine overall levels of effectiveness.102 The results point to positive 
perceptions about the role and effectiveness of the SFC from those with whom 
they have frequent dealings. Notable findings include:  
 
                                                 
101 Universities Scotland (2010) Towards a Scottish Solution: Universities Scotland’s first 
contribution towards finding a Scottish solution for the sustainable funding of the university sector, 
October 2010 
102 EKOS (2009) Survey of Scottish Funding Council Communications and Relations with 
Stakeholders, Scottish Funding Council April 2010 
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• A majority of respondents from HEIs and partners feel that SFC’s role has 
changed in the last two years, mainly citing the organisation’s more strategic 
role and its closer alignment to Government priorities – particularly in relation 
to economic development; 
• Around one third of HEI staff mentioned a role of the SFC’s being the 
‘implementation of Government policy’, but few saw the SFC as an 
intermediary in the passive sense; 
• A small number – though not a majority - of HEIs expressed concern about 
changes to the SFC’s role in implementing government policy. In particular 
that the SFC is becoming more prescriptive and more involved in operational 
planning at institutional level; 
• HEI respondents would like more direct contact between the SFC and HEI 
staff (an issue particularly for the senior staff) including through conferences, 
seminars and events; 
• Consultation with senior staff within HEIs needs to be more frequent and 
more meaningful. In particular HEIs raised concerns about the extent to which 
feedback is taken on board, engagement in the process not being early 
enough and a feeling that it is superficial – decisions having already been 
made prior to consultation; 
• The SFC Corporate Plan clearly articulates Scottish Government priorities but 
not all agreed with this focus and there is also a suggestion that the Plan is 
too high level (i.e. not sufficiently operational). 
 
12.32 Finally, it should be noted that despite all these proposed changes the 
Scottish Government acknowledges that the challenges remain significant. For a 
nation that credits itself with having invented free education, the implications of 
the Browne review and wider context of economic austerity in the UK have 
placed substantial pressures on the devolved Scottish administration.103 Future 
austerity measures come on the back of recent efficiencies amounting to at least 
                                                 
103 Herman A, (2001) How the Scots invented the Modern World, Crown Publishers: New York 
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£60 million in the last three years and finding further efficiencies, without harming 
HE provision, will be particularly demanding.104  
 
Tensions around the autonomy in higher education 
 
12.33 More generally, a limited review of the UK literature points to a number of 
tensions between Government and HEI on the issue of autonomy. In particular, 
these arise from a multitude of factors providing the rationale for, and against, 
autonomy for HEIs. 
 
12.34 The UK government has so far resisted formerly defining levels of 
autonomy in the UK. In their report Students and Universities (August 2009) the 
then Department for Innovation Universities and Skills Select Committee (now 
the Department for Business Innovation and Skills) recommended that the UK 
Government ask HEFCE and wider higher education network to ‘draw up, and 
seek to agree, a concordat defining those areas over which universities have 
autonomy, including the definition of academic freedom and, on the other side 
those areas where the government, acting on behalf of the tax payer, can 
reasonably and legitimately lay down requirements or intervene.’105 However, the 
Westminster Government rejected the recommendations, citing their satisfaction 
with roles and responsibilities in the existing arrangements.  
 
12.35 Indeed it might be seen as convenient for Government to choose not to 
challenge HEI autonomy overtly.  Rather through interpretation of when and how 
it is in the national interest the Government may exert control while avoiding 
open confrontation with the HE sector. That is not to say recent Government 
proposals have been restrained.  For example, in 2009 the then Secretary of 
State for Innovation, Universities and Skills suggested that HEFCE consider 
                                                 
104 Scottish Government (2008) New Horizons: responding to the challenges of the 21st century: 
The Report of the Joint Future Thinking Taskforce on Universities, p4 
105 DIUS Select Committee, 2009, page 88. 
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whether ‘a greater proportion of Higher Education funding might become 
contestable’ as a way of further influencing HEIs.106
 
12.36 The Government has certainly been active in linking funding to HEI activity 
in certain policy priority areas.107 Often linkages are expressed through subtle 
changes in language. Since the formation of the University Grants Committee in 
1919 the role of the intermediary organisation has been that of ‘buffer’.108 It might 
reasonably be assumed that the intervention of the House of Lords in drawing up 
the 1992 Act was primarily aimed at continuance of that role. However, that 
HEFCE, for example, now includes in their remit the role as ‘broker’109 between 
State and HEIs offers a subtle change in language that may be at odds with the 
intention of the 1992 Act.110
 
12.37 This ‘brokerage’ role has been implemented with some success. Clark 
(2006), for example, notes the role HEFCE has played in encouraging HEIs to 
work at the regional level through inter-University partnerships, improved links 
with Regional Development Agencies and management of key stimulants such 
as the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF).111  
 
12.38 But tensions are also perceptible. The increased tempo of desired change 
and the impact this may have on the consultation process within higher education 
is one. A possible consequence is that the model of consensual and consultative 
policy development that characterises much of funding council work across the 
UK may be undermined. The risk is if a Funding Council is obliged to trade sector 
                                                 
106 Letter to Tim Melville-Ross CBE, Chair of Higher Education Funding Council for England from 
Rt Hon John Denham MP Secretary of State for Innovations, Universities and Skills, 6 May 2009 
107 For example, Widening Access funding has clearly links to achieving the goals of AimHigher.   
108 More specifically it was the 1918 Haldane Report that first introduced the notion of a ‘buffer’ 
between Researchers and State 
109 See for example HEFCE’s response to Lord Browne's Independent Review of Higher 
Education Funding and Student Finance at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/news/hefce/2010/browne.htm 
110 Evans GR., (2010) University autonomy:two fault lines, Higher Education review, Vol 42, No. 
3, ISSN 0018-1609.   
111 Clark T. (2006) OECD Thematic Review of Tertiary Education Country Report: United 
Kingdom, Department for Education and Skills, Research Report RR767, London: OECD 
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consultation in favour of swift response, then its core value proposition as a 
broker may be materially compromised.112     
 
12.39 Notably, in this example, to ensure against such outcomes it has been 
recommended that HEFCE consider whether: 
• There should be an agreed shared strategy defining the relationship 
management between the Council and HEIs; 
• It could strengthen the means by which its relationship managers interact and 
exchange information concerning the oversight of related bodies; 
• The Government should ‘encourage nominations for HEFCE Board 
membership from heads of institutional governing bodies’.113 
 
12.40 Further tensions can also be identified in relation to: 
• Globalisation of the HE sector in particular how funding councils deal with 
online course provision. The internet operates at a level almost invisible to the 
state and this presents problems for overall strategic planning.114 For 
example, how will developing online provision overseas challenge UK HEIs, 
what benefits are there in relation to the widening participation agenda, how 
will quality be maintained (in the context that UK students pursuing online 
courses ‘overseas’ may still ultimately live and work in the UK).  
• The argument that increased competition will reduce the scope for 
collaboration because HEIs will more than ever want to offer what they 
perceive the market wants (within the constraints of their own strengths and 
capacity) and this may be different to the policy priorities set by 
government.115 However, market goals are not always societal goals and may 
                                                 
112 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
HEFCE (Final Report), March 
113 Ibid, p15-16 
114 Fielden (2008) Global Trends in University Governance, Education Working Paper Series 
Number 9, Washington DC: The World Bank 
115 Clark T. (2006) OECD Thematic Review of Tertiary Education Country Report: United 
Kingdom, Department for Education and Skills, Research Report RR767, London: OECD, p69 
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lead to specialisation in what the Government defines as low priority 
subjects.116 
• There should also be acceptance that institutions have particular subject 
strengths and that diversity should be welcomed and respected. Resource 
should be concentrated on encouraging HEIs to focus on their missions.117 
• The adequacy of current funding levels. Relatively UK HEIs are underfunded 
compared to some other modern countries.118 If the government wishes, for 
example, for increased inter-university collaboration then it must ensure 
sufficient funding is made available to support this.119 Moreover, a step 
change in capability can be brought about once institutions have the 
framework and funding to plan long term.120  
• An increasingly burdensome administrative landscape for HEIs in England.  
HEIs in the UK have had to bear the burden of quality inspections and 
accountability estimated at around £250million per annum in 2002.121 While 
the UK funding councils have been a key contributor to the introduction and 
operation of a much more proportionate regulatory environment, it is only one 
of a number of funders of the higher education sector and this trend has not 
necessarily been mirrored by other funding bodies.122 
• Policy priorities versus economic and social realities: the backdrop to the 
sector’s finances including the context which sees a triangulation of wider 
access to higher education versus public sector austerity constraints versus 
demographic changes (less 18-19 year olds).123  
                                                 
116 Tapper T. & Salter B., Understanding Governance and Policy Change in British Higher 
Education, p21 
117 The Council for Industry and Higher Education (2002) The Strategic Review of Higher 
Education...Influencing Policy, London: CIHE, p4 
118 Hermann K, (2008) The UK Education System: A Summary Input to the Canada:UK Colloquia, 
p7 
119 The Council for Industry and Higher Education (2002) The Strategic Review of Higher 
Education...Influencing Policy, London: CIHE, p4 
120 ibid 
121 The Council for Industry and Higher Education (2002) The Strategic Review of Higher 
Education...Influencing Policy, London: CIHE, p2 
122 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
HEFCE (Final Report), March, p12 
123 E.g.  
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• Greater state control may constrain universities. The breadth of difference in 
institutional missions, purposes, ambition and character of UK HEIs underpins 
the sector’s world-class performance;124 the UK is second only to the USA on 
leading scientific indicators and crucially, during the current economic climate, 
ranks first on publication productivity and citations in relation to research and 
development public spend.125 Moreover, some suggest that block funding is 
the natural partner of autonomous institutions because it allows HEIs the 
freedom to decide how they use these funds and it provides a degree of 
research stability and independence not provided by other funding sources.126 
• The dichotomy here between a performance monitoring / audit culture and 
professional responsibility, in particular, the need for enhanced performance 
from HEIs whilst requiring them to reveal and justify their practices. In 
particular: ‘Perhaps most threatening is the public nature of the process: the 
rush to publish league tables that place failing institutions (.....) in the 
spotlight.’127 
• Whether there is equivalence between publically funded institutions. Though 
societal institutions do not carry equal political weight, to what extent are 
other funded sectors autonomous, in respect of requirements to modify 
activity to meet imposed targets?128   
• Instability and, in particular, political cycles bring new policy goals. Political 
whim and fads come and go.  HEIs may argue that transmitting and extending 
knowledge is in contrast somewhat eternal in comparison. 129 
• The notion that HEIs receive public funding and therefore should align their 
activity to support public policy objectives and priorities.  In particular, moves 
towards a mass system of higher education in the UK with all the associated 
                                                 
124 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) Independent Review Group of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of HEFCE 
(Final Report), March 
125 International benchmarking study of UK research performance 2009’, published by Evidence, 
commissioned by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
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128 ibid 
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issues of funding, access, and quality have all stimulated ‘consumer’, and 
henceforth, political interest. Additionally, Government may argue that it will 
still be held responsible for policy outcomes even if it should lessen its control 
of governance.130  
• Higher education is a public as well as private good.  Graduates are relatively 
wealthier, healthier, more knowledgeable, law abiding and tolerant that those 
who are not.131 In this respect those espousing more rather than less 
autonomy may suggest that while Government does fund in part higher 
education in the UK, that higher education already provides very real benefits 
to UK society.132 
• Finally, Evans (2010) questions whether it is even appropriate to describe 
HEIs as autonomous entities, in the sense that they are discreet institutions 
operating with a sense of unity. He points to a number of conspicuous failures 
within HEI internal system and identifies that indirectly government might view 
this as rationale for exerting further control.133 
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13. Autonomy and accountability: Some International Findings  
 
Overview 
 
13.1 In this section we widen the review to include an international perspective 
on HEI autonomy and accountability. Of particular interest are the recent trends 
in governance systems in the more economically advanced countries, how these 
systems compare and what has been learnt in relation to good practices. 
 
13.2 In approaching the international literature on autonomy three issues must be 
borne in mind. Firstly, the focus remains on the external linkages, i.e. governance 
of higher education systems rather than issues of HEI (internal) administration.  
Secondly, and inevitably, higher education outside of the United Kingdom is 
comprised of a far more diverse landscape of HE systems and structures.  
Inherently, much of what we see is based upon historical developments and 
rooted in the wider culture within those countries. Thirdly, in many countries 
(particularly non-English speaking countries) past systems relied heavily on 
direct state/government control and developments in the higher education sector 
have been towards more autonomy from HEIs.134  From what we have already 
seen this differs markedly from the case in the UK (and other ‘Anglo’ countries 
like Australia) where historically HEIs have had relatively more autonomy in 
running their own affairs. Indeed changes in the ‘Anglo’ countries towards 
something akin to a ‘quasi-market’135 within higher education have meant less 
autonomy for the sector’s HEIs.  
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Fielden J (2010), The Changing Roles of University Governing Boards and Councils. In: 
Penelope Peterson, Eva Baker, Barry McGaw, (Editors), International Encyclopaedia of 
Education. volume 4, pp. 273-278. Oxford: 
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Growing Pressures 
 
13.3 In previously centralised systems many governments are turning away from 
detailed control in favour of a more supervisory role that focuses on shaping 
strategy.136 In countries like the UK with a history of more ‘independent’ higher 
education sectors governments are faced with the conflicting needs to exert 
control without damaging the autonomy of the higher education sector (and 
losing the benefits that come from that autonomy).  
 
13.4 Some authors argue that these two processes actually represent a 
convergence to certain commonalities.137 Moreover, they suggest that change 
can be linked to a number of pervasive and quite unremitting driving forces over 
the last half century including: globalisation (increasing competition and choice); 
the spread of neo-liberal idealism (individualization of society) and increasing 
public knowledge and awareness leading to closer scrutiny on issues of 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy.138 139    
 
13.4 What is clear is that by the 1980s, governments, concerned at the 
limitations to which HEIs could interpret (through their research and teaching 
activities) what was good for society, were actively seeking alternative 
arrangements for shaping higher education.140 This came in the form of the New 
Public Management approach which espouses the use of private sector 
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mechanisms of incentives and competition to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services.141  
 
13.5 What resulted has been something of a transformation in the structural 
governance and autonomy of HEIs. HEIs moved towards positions of being 
neither state controlled nor purely autonomous entities.  Instead a system of 
‘remote steering’ by Government has emerged centred around demonstrating 
value for money.142  
 
13.6 Implicit in this process is a rationale for some level of Government 
intervention based upon, for example: 
 
• General concern around the extent to which teaching and research within 
HEIs is aligned with specific national economic and social objectives;143 
• Frustrations around ‘sluggish decision-making’ within HEIs on issues of 
accountability;144  
• A view that there is a lack of clarity regarding responsibilities at odds with an 
increasingly complex higher education landscape; 
• The contention that Government can play a significant role in supporting HEIs 
in respect of: positive externalities (i.e. civic virtues and citizenship values), 
‘paternalism’ (i.e. students may not be sufficiently informed to make rational 
choices) and equality of opportunity goals;145  
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• A notion that placing higher education at the centre of Government economic 
and social policy actually empowers HEIs;146   
• Irrespective of alignment and contribution to national goals, a view that 
autonomy is necessary but not sufficient at the institutional level:  a review of 
high-ranking universities found three connected factors at the Institutional 
level: concentration of talent, abundant funding and appropriate 
governance;147  
• The contention that HEIs are in practice loosely comprised bodies rather than 
unified entities, easily at risk of fragmentation, duplication or other negatively 
perceived outcomes.148 
 
13.7 However, the literature also identifies a strong repost (mainly by HEIs) 
arguing for more autonomy, based upon: 
 
• The notion that autonomy allows institutions to manage their affairs efficiently 
and responsively to changing patterns of demand.149 The Council of the 
European Union (2007) for example, makes an explicit link between 
autonomy and their ability of HEIs to respond to society expectations150; 
• An argument that there is an inherent undervaluing by government of HEIs’ 
contribution to societal goals. While much is known, for example, about the 
private benefit of secondary education, because of the complexity of HEIs 
often little is known about the full direct and indirect economic and social 
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benefits of HEIs. Without this data is it reasonable to require HEIs to do more, 
particularly in relation to what might be narrowly defined objectives?;151 
• Government priorities may be at odds with subject demand. HEIs operate 
nationally and internationally, government priorities are often more localised 
to regional or even sub-regional levels. Moreover if priorities are too localised, 
then insisting on HEI alignment may expose subject courses to considerable 
fluctuations in demand due to changing contexts e.g. economic crises;152 
• Issues of trust including HEI distrust of government labour market information, 
policy direction, or where the accountability and governance agenda is 
deemed too short-term and reactive and with (possibly opportunistic) partisan 
inclinations.153       
 
 Trends and Challenges 
 
13.8 Wherever the balance of the argument lies, the inexorable move towards 
increased HEI accountability (without direct Government control) has 
undoubtedly created challenges.  In the last section we identified a number of 
tensions described in the UK focused literature. With reference to a number of 
countries, the OECD has described how the way in which competing priorities of 
HEI self-determination and national priorities are reconciled will depend on a 
country’s response to a number of identified challenges, including those 
presented in Figure 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 Jones G.A. (2005) On Complex Intersections: Ontario Universities and Governments, 
University of Toronto 
152 Chatterton P. and Goddard J. (2000) The Response of Higher Education Institutions to 
Regional Needs, European Journal of Education, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000, Oxford: Blackwell, p484 
153  Sossin L. (2005) 
 
Public Universities and the Public Interest: Toward a Vision of Governmental 
Oversight, University of Toronto 
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Figure 5: Main challenges in tertiary education  
Function Main challenges 
 
Steering tertiary 
education 
• Articulating clearly the nation’s expectations of the tertiary 
education system.  
• Aligning priorities of individual institutions with the nation’s 
economic and social goals.  
• Creating coherent systems of tertiary education.  
• Finding the proper balance between governmental steering and 
institutional autonomy.  
• Developing institutional governance arrangements to respond 
to external expectations.  
Funding tertiary 
education 
• Ensuring the long-term financial sustainability of tertiary 
education.  
• Devising a funding strategy consistent with the goals of the 
tertiary education system.  
• Using public funds efficiently.  
Quality of tertiary 
education 
• Developing quality assurance mechanisms for accountability 
and improvement.  
• Generating a culture of quality and transparency.  
• Adapting quality assurance to diversity of offerings.  
Links with the labour 
market 
• Including labour market perspectives and actors in tertiary 
education policy.  
• Ensuring the responsiveness of institutions to graduate labour 
market outcomes.  
• Providing study opportunities for flexible, work-oriented study.  
Source: adapted from OECD (2008)154
 
13.9 These challenges are significant. The need to articulate expectations, or 
define priorities immediately, challenges policy makers to identify, collate and 
reconcile diverging interests across stakeholder groups. For example, there is a 
need to define what constitutes ‘student needs’ within a higher education 
landscape where concepts like lifelong learning, online learning and part-time 
study are ever more popular; Moreover, decision makers will wish determine 
where, how and on what frequency should labour market ‘actors’ be engaged?).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
154 OECD (April 2008) Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society, Thematic Review of Tertiary 
Education: Synthesis Report, Overview, p5 
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Levels of autonomy and lines of accountability  
 
13.10 The research on governance models can be categorised as falling in to 
either theoretical or empirical (typologies) approaches. 
 
13.11 Theoretical models tend to compare the influence of key variables – 
government influence, HEI autonomy (academic oligarchy, executive autonomy), 
other factors (e.g. intermediary bodies/agents, market forces) - to determinately 
analyse potential modes of co-operation. Clark (1983) postulated three distinct 
mechanisms for coordination or integration of university activity: the state, the 
market or an academic oligarchy. 155 Reducing Clark’s three-dimensional space 
of governance to a two-dimensional one van Vught (1989) contrasts the ‘State 
control’ model found mostly in continental Europe and the ‘State supervisory’ 
model associated with higher education in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries.156 The 
former displays strong state regulation and an influential academic ‘body’. The 
latter shows less state influence (limited to providing the broad framework), but 
also increased influence from intermediary bodies and actors. 
 
13.12 Fielden (2008) provides an example of an empirical (typological) model 
based around the legal status given to HEIs.157 Figure 6 models four potential 
typologies.158   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 E.g. Clark B. R. (1983) The Higher Education System. Academic Organisation in Cross-
National Perspective, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
156 Vught F. A. van (1989) Governmental Strategies and Innovation in Higher Education, London: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers  
157 Fielden (2008) Global Trends in University Governance, Education Working Paper Series 
Number 9, The World Bank, March 2008: Washington DC 
158 A major European research project led by the European University Association is currently 
reviewing the “Autonomy scorecard” project for a number of European countries. The project 
which is funded from the European Commission’s Lifelong Learning programme began in 
October 2009 and will run for two years. Through such research additional examples may be 
draw in relation to typological models such as Fielden’s. 
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Figure 6: Levels of Autonomy  
Institutional 
Governance Model 
Status of Public Universities  Examples  
State control Can be agency of the Ministry of 
Education or a state-owned corporation 
Malaysia 
Semi-autonomous Can be agency of the Ministry of 
Education, a state-owned corporation 
or a statutory body 
 
New Zealand, 
France 
 
Semi independent A statutory body, a charity or a non-
profit corporation 
subject to Ministry of Education control  
Singapore 
Independent. A statutory body, charity or non- profit 
corporation 
with no government participation and 
control linked to national strategies and 
related only to public funding  
 
Australia, 
United 
Kingdom 
 
Source: Fielden (2008) 159
 
13.13 Braun and Merrien (1999) have described various typologies differentiated 
by the mix of their  characteristics, including: ‘utilitarian culture’ (a culture where 
public institutions are expected to provide useful services); ‘tight or loose 
substantial’ (the right and authority to decide on goals and programmes / goal-
setting capacity of government in matters of education and research – tight 
means government goal setting is prominent); ‘tight or loose procedural’ (level of 
administrative control of universities by policy-makers).160   The typologies were:  
                                                 
159 Fielden (2008) Global Trends in University Governance, Education Working Paper Series 
Number 9, The World Bank, March 2008: Washington DC, p9 
160 Braun D. (1999) New Managerialism and the Governance of Universities in a Comparative 
Perspective, in Braun D. and Merrien F.X. (eds.) Towards a New Model of Governance for 
Universities? A Comparative View, Higher Education Policy Series, London: Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers Ltd. p5-7 
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• Bureaucratic-Etatist: Non-utilitarian culture, tight substantial, tight procedural 
(e.g. Sweden); 
• Market: Utilitarian culture, loose substantial, loose procedural (e.g. U.S.A); 
• Corporatist-statist: Utilitarian culture, tight substantial, tight procedural (e.g. 
Russian Federation); 
• Bureaucratic–oligarchic: Non-utilitarian culture, tight substantial, tight 
procedural (e.g. Germany, Italy, Switzerland); 
• Collegium: Non-utilitarian culture, loose substantial, loose procedural (e.g. 
U.K.). 
 
13.14 Marginson and Considine (2000) have argued that Australian higher 
education system can be modelled around ‘enterprise universities’ whereby 
historical autonomy has given way to an increasingly restricted choice of 
commercially focused options.161 In this respect Rhoades and Slaughter (2004) 
talk of an ‘academic capitalism’ model in countries like the Australia, Canada, 
United Kingdom and United States.162 They describe a higher education 
landscape whereby the boundaries between the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors have been blurred in part, by a fundamental change in the relationship 
between Government, HEIs and the private sector. 
 
13.15 Both theoretical and empirical models capture the diversity of higher 
education systems in the more advanced countries. They help reveal that even if 
overall harmonisation trends (e.g. around accountability) are visible, very distinct 
individual structures remain.163   
 
13.16 Nevertheless, the challenge of finding an appropriate balance between 
centralisation and decentralisation remains. For Governments trying to shape 
                                                 
161 Marginson S., Considine M. (2000) The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and 
Reinvention in Australia, Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press 
162 Slaughter S and Rhoades G. (2004) Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, 
State and Higher Education. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press 
163 Huisman J., Meek L. Wood F. (2007) Institutional diversity in higher education: a cross-
national and longitudinal analysis, Higher Education Quarterly, 61 (4) p. 573 
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higher education, a plethora of mechanisms are available to this effect.  These 
include, for example, imposing quality assurance frameworks, performance-
related funding, market orientated mechanisms, transparent information flows, 
increased participation of external stakeholders in governing bodies, and more.  
Issues of which mechanisms and to what extent they should be used therefore 
become central.   
 
Policy Options 
 
13.17 The OECD164  has produced findings that attempt to distil potentially useful 
ideas and lessons from the experiences of countries that have been searching 
for better ways to govern their higher education systems.165 In particular 
countries may wish to: 
 
• Develop a coherent strategic vision for higher education: ideally from a 
systematic national strategic review of higher education. Recent 
comprehensive examples include: the Review of Higher Education (2008) in 
Australia.166  
• Establish appropriate instruments for shaping higher education: 
consider innovative methods such as performance contracts or performance-
related funding and use of institutional competition and student choice to 
shape HEI behaviour (relying heavily on student mobility and clear 
information on HEI quality and performance). In Austria, public funding is 
based for 20% on a funding formula, while 80% is allocated on the basis of a 
‘contract agreement’ between the university and the Ministry and includes 
coverage of social goals and inter-university co-operation. Overall, there has 
                                                 
164 OECD (2008) Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society: OECD Thematic Review of 
Tertiary Education: Synthesis Report 
165 OECD basis the findings on the experiences reported in the Country Background Reports, the 
analyses of external review teams, and the wider research literature associated with 24 OECD 
countries. The list is not definitive or exhaustive.  The OECD makes clear that Stakeholders will 
wish to draw upon ideas as appropriate to their country’s unique social, economic and 
educational structures and traditions. 
166 Commonwealth of Australia (December 2008) Review of Australian Higher Education 
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been a strong trend towards block grant funding - usually accompanied by 
performance criteria and targets – in most European systems. Notably in 
Sweden and Slovenia the block grant is subject to broad categorisation which 
impedes universities from transferring large amounts from a major post. More 
rigid regimes such as line-item budgets – where HEIs receive their funding 
already pre-allocated to cost items and/or activities – are now much less 
common and generally confined to Eastern European Governments such as 
Bulgaria and Greece.167 
• Ensure coherence where there is extensive diversification: diversification 
in higher education widens the reach of HEIs and in theory is better able to 
meet national needs (and take advantage of national opportunities) however 
without co-ordination (i.e. regular review of HEI missions) each sub-system 
may evolve independently leading to a fragmented sector with little coherence 
and increased risks in terms of efficiency, duplication and subject gaps. There 
is some evidence that encouraging specialisation can support diversification. 
For example, the Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario has recently 
told all higher education institutions in the province to identify which 
specialities they excel in and restrict their bids for government funding to 
those areas.168 
• Encourage HEIs to align with the national strategic priorities: the use of 
strategic plans drawn up by the HEIs and linked to accountability and 
strategic funding awards. Government may also wish to review options to 
widen the scope of institutional autonomy so as to allow for greater 
responsiveness (to students, stakeholders, regions) and efficiency in 
operations. 
• Make HEI funding for teaching formula-driven, related to both input and 
output indicators and with components that are sensitive to (national) 
strategic targets: in particular use of a transparent (but non-bureaucratic) 
                                                 
167 Estermann T. & Nokkala T. (2009) University Autonomy in Europe I: Explorative Study, 
Brussels: European University Association  
168 Times Higher Education (4 November 2010) Ontario institutions told to find and stick to niches 
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approach which shields allocation decisions from political pressures.  A mix of 
‘core’ funding - which should to some extent include output-oriented indicators 
to support excellence in teaching and learning – and performance related 
funding with internal indicators (completion rates) and external indicators 
(quality of graduates). 
• Ensure that ‘quality assurance’ exists within a framework aligned to the 
goals of higher education and with key stakeholder viewpoints. Quality 
assurance should serve both improvement and accountability purposes with a 
rebalancing towards the former over time where HEIs demonstrate continuing 
good performance. HEIs should be encouraged to develop a ‘quality culture’. 
• Improve knowledge diffusion rather than strengthening 
commercialisation: innovation (taking a product to market) ‘is a journey’ that 
draws upon research ‘to solve problems’. Awareness and understanding add 
efficiency and support the innovation process. Knowledge diffusion is 
therefore just as important as commercialisation.   
• Encourage inter-institutional collaboration and support diffusion of 
research findings by supporting collaboration between HEIs and between 
HEIs and other private and public organisations. 
• Reconcile academic freedom with institutions’ contributions to society: 
Options include re-conceptualising what comprises academic work. This 
means academic freedom needs to be framed within institutions’ obligation to 
society, e.g. with academics pursuing their objectives while accounting for 
institutional goals, being provided with support and conditions to meet these 
goals. While academics ought to have autonomy in the design of the courses 
they teach and the research they undertake, priorities may be influenced at 
the institution or system level.  
• Create conditions for the successful implementation of reforms: In order 
to build consensus, it is important that all stakeholders – including those 
beyond the HE sector - see proposed tertiary education policies within the 
broader policy framework and strategy. One way of achieving this is delegate 
responsibility for forward strategy to those stakeholders. For example, in 
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Ontario, Canada, the Presidents of the Provinces’ 24 Colleges recently 
combined to proposed ‘A New Vision For Higher Education in Ontario.’169  
This report links the role of Colleges in the Province with regional and national 
policy objectives. 
• Ensure clarity of purpose: Individuals and groups are more likely to accept 
changes that are not necessarily in their own best interests if they understand 
the reasons for these changes and can see the role they should play within 
the broad national strategy. Change is best facilitated by communicating a 
clear long term vision, supported with robust evidence of opportunities as well 
as the likely threats that come with inaction. There is also evidence that 
reforms which are sustained by external pressures (e.g. limitations of public 
funding) stand a better chance of successful implementation. Common 
external problems unite stakeholders in response. Similarly, the use of project 
pilots can create ‘internal’ pressures on HEIs based around competition.  
 
13.18 However, not all authors agree that such an interventionist approach will 
bring success. Jones (2005) argues against the use of an intermediary (buffer) 
agency between Government and HEIs. Specifically it: ‘may do more harm than 
good (.....). The intersections between government and university activities are 
simply too complex and multifaceted to be structurally routed through some form 
of buffer agency.’ As such an intermediary body is no longer a ‘viable structural 
mechanism for coordination’.170
 
13.19 MacTaggert (2003)171 drawing on a number of examples from the United 
States contends that more autonomy should be provided to HEIs. He suggests 
this might be achieved through: 
 
                                                 
169  A New Vision For Higher Education in Ontario: Submitted by the presidents of  Ontario’s 24 
public colleges, Colleges Ontario, 2009 
170 Jones G.A.(2005) On Complex Intersections: Ontario Universities and Governments, 
University of Toronto, p15 
171 MacTaggart T. (2003) A New State-University Relationship for a Stronger Economy Forum: 
Moving from Fiscal Constraint to New State-University Partnerships, Wisconsin Center for the 
Advancement of Postsecondary Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
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• Putting the new policies in statute which will be necessary to secure 
permanent change; 
• Making expectations few, clear and important: avoiding vague objectives like 
‘respond to local educational needs’ or bolstering them with more specific and 
measurable objectives; 
• Granting substantial independence in return for greater accountability. 
Reinventing government is often more difficult than anticipated.  
• Combating entrenched state bureaucracies which will resist loss of control 
and predict dire consequences from devolving authority; 
• Making and following through on commitments to the new relationship 
advocated by political and policy leaders; 
• Implementing a system of independent review to ensure that greater 
autonomy in statute is in fact being exercised.  A summative evaluation 
should be scheduled five years after the new relationship is initiated, with 
periodic interim reports before that time. The review should recommend 
changes if promised results are not achieved. 
• Developing the new relationship through negotiated agreements among 
political and university leaders and including heads of state agencies in the 
discussions.  The ultimate success of these efforts will depend on the 
practicality of the agreement and on the levels of trust among the key players. 
 
13.20 However, Sossin (2005) argues that public interest would not be served 
either by direct government intervention in university affairs nor by completely 
devolved authority over university affairs to the universities themselves. Rather, 
she asserts that: ‘a proper balance between autonomy and accountability must 
address the interests of both universities and governments but should not be 
unilaterally determined by either.’ In this respect, she contends there is a 
compelling case for an intermediary (buffer) agency both to help find and 
implement the proper balance.172 However, consideration should be given to:  
                                                 
172 Sossin L. (2005) 
 
Public Universities and the Public Interest: Toward a Vision of Governmental 
Oversight, University of Toronto 
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• The formal or informal means at the disposal of the intermediary body to 
resist government pressure; 
• Avoiding establishing just a new, cumbersome and different level of 
bureaucracy to navigate; 
• Setting up an intermediary body comprised of only appointees from the 
HEIs themselves (a so called stakeholder led buffer agency);173 
• The role a statutory audit body may take in providing financial oversight. 
 
Conclusion 
 
13.21 Despite the complexities higher education remains central to the economic 
and societal goals of advanced nations. OECD (2008) recommends that 
governments find the proper balance between governmental steering and 
institutional autonomy.174   
 
13.22 What seems to be emerging is a notion of workable balance between 
independence and accountability. This will depend on a number of factors 
including the needs of key stakeholder organisations (primarily HEIs and 
government), prior fundamentals such as culture and historical development of 
HEI as well pragmatic factors of cost and complexity. 
 
13.23 However, while this review – and other researchers175 - have distinguished 
governance from the procedural aspects of management (i.e. HEI leadership and 
administration), this is likely to be an inappropriate distinction since the internal 
management processes of HEIs are likely to have significant influence on the 
                                                 
173 See Council of Ontario Universities (http://www.cou.on.ca/_bin/home/aboutCouncil.cfm ) 
174 OECD (2008) Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society: OECD Thematic Review of 
Tertiary Education: Synthesis Report, April 2008 
175 E.g. Middlehurst R. (1999) New Realities for Leadership and Governance in Higher 
Education? in Tertiary education and management, Vol. 5, p311-312 
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effectiveness of their contribution to wider societal goals.176 Indeed, as one 
author states:  
 
‘national systems are blunt instruments for reform. The state or other main 
sponsors cannot do the job of reform for the universities. Only universities 
themselves can take the essential actions.’177
                                                 
176 Reed M. I., Meek L. and Jones, G.A (2002) in Amaral A.,  Jones G.A. and Karseth B., (eds.) 
Governing Higher Education: National Perspectives on Institutional Governance, London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, pXXVII)  
177 Clark B. (2001) The Entrepreneurial University: New Foundations for Collegiality, Autonomy, 
and Achievement in Education and Skills (2008) Journal of the Programme on Institutional  
Management in Higher Education, OECD, p11 
 88
14. Case Studies 
 
14.1 This section presents three international case studies. The purpose is firstly 
to indicate the many different approaches economically developed countries 
have taken in approaching issues of autonomy and accountability. Secondly, in 
understanding the experiences of other countries some useful learning points - 
applicable to Wales - might be drawn.  
 
Case Study 1: Provinces of the Atlantic Canada Region 
 
14.2 While the legislative authority in Canada is shared by the federal 
government, ten provincial governments and three territorial governments, under 
the 1867 Constitution Act there is no federal ministry of education; provincial 
Governments have responsibility for all levels of education. Federal support to 
higher education comes only in the form of fiscal transfer, research funding and 
student support and, since the 1996 Employment Insurance Act, Labour Market 
Development Agreements with the Provinces in respect to development of active 
employment benefits programmes.   
 
14.3 In terms of higher education context the ‘Atlantic Canada’ region shares 
many similarities to Wales. Comprised of four provinces (Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador) and with a 
population of around 2.4million, it: 
• Has a history of low economic performance (and net inward government 
transfers) compared to some other parts of Canada; 
• Has many small HEIs with different historical foundations that have a large 
impact on their local economies. Scale is a problem, not just within higher 
education but also the wider economy where, for instance, the region does 
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not have critical mass in many of its research and innovation systems (i.e. 
infrastructure and industrial capacity are also limited) ;178 
• Is bilingual (with pockets of English and French speaking communities); 
• Suffers from severe outward migration of graduates;  
• Faces significant competition from larger, established HEIs in metropolitan 
areas of Canada.179 
 
14.4 The region comprises 16 universities and three community colleges. The 
Universities are considered minor players in the Canadian higher education 
landscape.180 There is significant diversity though:  ranging from ‘full-service’ 
universities with sizeable graduate numbers (e.g. Memorial University of 
Newfoundland) to smaller liberal arts institutions (e.g. Mount Allison University).  
Noticeably there are few so-called ‘dual’ universities – universities offering both 
further and higher education – despite the concept being popular in other part of 
Canada such as British Columbia.181
 
Autonomy 
 
14.5 As with other Provinces across Canada, higher education in the Atlantic 
region derives about three-quarters of its funding from the provincial and federal 
                                                 
178 Cornford A., (GPT Management Ltd.), Marin Consultants, Inc. and Gardner Pinfold 
Consultants Ltd (2002) Innovation and Commercialization in Atlantic Canada, Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency 
179 Garlick S., Davies G., Polèse M. and Kitagawa F. (2006) Supporting the Contribution of Higher 
Education Institutions to Regional Development: Peer Review Report: Atlantic Canada, OECD 
Directorate for Education, Education Management and Infrastructure Division, Programme on 
Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE)  
180 Garlick S., Davies G., Polèse M. and Kitagawa F. (2006) Supporting the Contribution of Higher 
Education Institutions to Regional Development: Peer Review Report: Atlantic Canada, OECD 
Directorate for Education, Education Management and Infrastructure Division, Programme on 
Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE) 
181 ‘Duals’ are thought to offer a plausible option for regions searching for better learning 
pathways.   Nova Scotia has chosen to create through legislation two autonomous, four-year 
degree-granting.  Other Provinces within the Atlantic region have however shown no interest. See 
Sparks J., Scherf K., Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, British Columbia, Canada 
Continental 'Drift': Autonomy, Government, and Governance in Canadian Duals, Coast to Coast 
to Coast Society for research into Higher Education, Annual Conference December 2010 
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governments (the largest share provided by the former). Government support 
varies widely by institution and by level (college or university).  
 
14.6 Though heavily dependent on government funding, universities in the 
Atlantic Canada region have considerable autonomy with respect to academic 
policy and organization. There is no pan-Canadian accrediting body to evaluate 
the quality of degree programs.  Programmes are subject to internal quality 
assurance processes and a university’s membership of the Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) is generally accepted as evidence 
that appropriate standards have been met. 
 
14.7 Government intervention is generally limited to finances, fee structures, and 
the introduction of new programmes. The main federal influence (other than fiscal 
transfer) comes through the work of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
(ACOA). The ACOA is in effect a separate ministry with its own responsible 
minister, elected from the region. A key strength of the ACOA has been its 
longevity. Founded in 1987 it has built a formidable understanding of the region 
which has helped build and maintain credibility with key partners including within 
higher education.182  
 
14.8 However, there are several co-ordinating bodies and lobbies that have 
come into being; most notably the Council of Atlantic Premiers183 and the Atlantic 
                                                 
182 Garlick S., Davies G., Polèse M. and Kitagawa F. (2006) Supporting the Contribution of Higher 
Education Institutions to Regional Development: Peer Review Report: Atlantic Canada, OECD 
Directorate for Education, Education Management and Infrastructure Division, Programme on 
Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE) 
183 Council of Atlantic Premiers (CAP) represents a Memorandum of Understanding in which all 
four (Provincial) Premiers expressed their common desire to cooperate for the benefit of the 
residents of the Atlantic Canada region.  In particular to: strengthen the economic 
competitiveness of the region; 
improve the quality of public services to Atlantic Canadians and improve the cost-effectiveness of 
delivering public services to Atlantic Canadians. (Council of Atlantic Premiers (2001) Working 
Together for Atlantic Canada: an action plan for regional co-operation, 2001-2003 Halifax, N.S: 
CAP and Council of Atlantic Premiers (2005) Building on Progress: Atlantic action plan, 2005-08, 
Halifax, N.S: CAP
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Provinces Economic Council.184 Moreover, the region’s universities have come 
together to form the Association of Atlantic Universities and more recently, the 
Council of Atlantic Premiers has sponsored the creation of the Atlantic Provinces 
Community College Consortium, which co-ordinates initiatives such as block 
transfer agreements between provinces. 
 
14.9 In terms of intermediary bodies the Maritime Provinces Higher Education 
Commission (MPHEC) was established in 1974 for the provinces of New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. The MPHEC is an agency of 
the Council of Atlantic Premiers and plays an advisory role, with the specific aims 
of:185
 
• Providing assurances that programmes developed by institutions meet 
agreed-upon quality criteria; 
• Confirming that institutions have appropriate policies and practices to ensure 
the ongoing quality of their programmes; 
• Facilitating and promoting cost-effectiveness of, and accessibility to, the 
broadest range possible of programmes; 
• Collecting, storing and maintaining quality, comprehensive and relevant 
information across all mandated functions; 
• Devising data and information products providing stakeholders with value, 
across all mandated functions, especially related to key post-secondary 
education issues; 
• Increasing awareness of, and dialogue on, Maritime Post-Secondary 
Education (PSE) issues and opportunities, both in the Maritimes and 
nationally; 
• Promoting and facilitating cooperation within the Maritimes and with other 
provinces and external partners to, among other things, facilitate, among 
                                                 
184 Founded in 1954 Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) is an independent think-tank 
dedicated to economic progress in Atlantic Canada (http://www.apec-econ.ca/Mandate.asp) 
185 The Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission Mandate 
http://www.mphec.ca/about/mandateandact.aspx 
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institutions and among governments for example, the development of cost-
effective and collaborative approaches to administration, programmes and 
policies; 
• Providing advice and services to the provinces, as requested; 
• Ensure the effective and efficient management of Commission resources 
(corporate objective).186 
 
14.10 The Newfoundland and Labrador Council for Higher Education (CHE) 
provides a similar role, promoting collaboration by providing recommendations to 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, the College of the North Atlantic (CNA) 
and the Minister of Education. The CHE was recognized in legislation through the 
Council on Higher Education Act in 2006.187 Notably this legislation also requires 
HEIs to demonstrate greater connectedness with each other and strong 
accountability to the public. 
 
Issues within higher education 
 
14.11 Core issues for higher education in the Atlantic Canada region centre on 
its contribution to the wider economy, in particular:  
• Retaining graduates and up-skilling the working population; 
• Improving the competitiveness of regional researchers in national 
research funding opportunities; 
• Increasing the comparatively low level of matched funding provided for 
innovation in the region by local business (which tends to be SME 
dominated in profile). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
186 ibid 
187  Council on Higher Education Act, S.N.L. 2006, c. C-37.001 
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Response 
 
14.12 The recent OECD Peer Review of higher education in Atlantic Canada 
found a number of good practices. Each of the provinces was found to have a 
Vision for higher education. New Brunswick has, for example, instigated a 
‘Quality Learning Agenda’ representing a ten year vision based around a full 
continuum of learning from early childhood through to adult learning.188  
 
14.13 There was thought to be a growing culture of co-operation across the four 
provinces based around region-wide initiatives, including: 
 
• Block transfer credit arrangements which strengthen education pathways 
across community colleges and universities; 
• An Atlantic Innovation Fund, which has been an important catalyst in 
boosting the research and innovation partnerships between HEIs and 
businesses; 
• Springboard, which promotes the sharing of resources and expertise among 
universities to support technology transfer; 
• Joint (cross Provincial) applied research e.g. Genome Atlantic project. 
 
14.14 The review also found evidence of a number of successful provincial 
initiatives, such as the debt forgiveness programmes aimed at arresting the brain 
drain of graduate students (e.g. New Brunswick Student Loan Assistance 
Programme).189   
 
14.15 There have also been a number of initiatives at the HEI level aimed, 
broadly, at enhancing contribution to the wider community, including: 
                                                 
188 Government of New Brunswick (2003) Quality Learning Agenda: Ten-year vision to strengthen 
N.B.'s education system  
189http://www.unbf.ca/financialaid/documents/GovernmentStudentLoanDebtReductionProgramsA
crossCanada.pdf 
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• Brokerage bodies between higher education research and community needs 
(e.g. the Leslie Harris Centre of Regional Policy and Development at 
Memorial University);  
• Specialist research and consultancy (e.g. Harris Centre and the Mount 
Allison University Rural and Small Town Programme); 
• Innovation and technology transfer between universities and business 
enterprises (e.g. Genesis Centre at Memorial University);  
• Lifelong learning initiatives (e.g. Mount SaintVincent University). 
 
14.16 Finally the Review190 proposed a number of suggestions for improvement, 
including that: 
 
• HEIs consider increasing specialisation as well as increasing efforts in 
developing smooth pathways for students who wish to move from one 
institution to another; 
• HEIs increase their efforts in student recruiting and marketing: going out into 
the schools, workplaces, social service settings, and inviting potential 
students to take advantage of opportunities they may neither know about nor 
trust. 
 
14.17 Moreover, the Review team suggested more could be done to build 
capacity within the region and in this respect they proposed:   
 
• Improving the ‘reaching in’ capacity of HEIs. ‘Reaching in’ relates to how 
internal processes and activities can be improved for better engagement and 
impact beyond the Institution.  Suggestions for improvements included: 
                                                 
190 Garlick S., Davies G., Polèse M. and Kitagawa F. (2006) Supporting the Contribution of Higher 
Education Institutions to Regional Development: Peer Review Report: Atlantic Canada, OECD 
Directorate for Education, Education Management and Infrastructure Division, Programme on 
Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE),  
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o Each institution undertaking an audit of how it is currently contributing 
to the region’s development and identify how its contribution on this 
might be enhanced; 
o Each HEI appointing a key executive person with the  responsibility for 
ensuring that their scholarship connections with the regional 
community are developed in a comprehensive way; 
o Mission and value statements of each institution should convey 
commitment to the future development of the regional community; 
o HEIs partnering with regional resources to realise savings and achieve 
more comprehensive outcomes, (e.g. using community facilities or 
allowing greater public access to their own facilities); 
 
• Improving the ‘reaching out’ capacity of HEIs.   This relates to the wider 
perception of HEIs.  Suggestions for improvement in this respect included:   
o HEIs need to reflect a welcoming persona and reach-out into the 
community.  A clear point of contact was important.  Moreover it was 
thought important that HEI leaders publicly commit their institution to 
the community’s development through the media, public events, 
through memoranda of understanding, and key alliances; 
o Development of clear and communicated unambiguous learning 
pathways based around lifelong learning; 
o Research and innovation agenda based around consultation with local 
community stakeholders to identify specific needs. 
 
• Government level response, in particular in relation to: 
o A new region-specific competitive grant with the objectives of 
enhancing structural reform and efficiency (e.g. resource sharing, 
improving education pathways, avoiding duplication and overlap in 
programme offerings); 
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o A revised funding allocation to take account of issues of spatial equity 
by recognising the higher costs and lower opportunity of locating a 
campus in a non-metropolitan area; 
o The setting up of an Atlantic Research Grants Council modelled on 
that of the old Quebec FCAR whereby new researchers are 
encouraged to focus on Atlantic-specific issues. 
 
Case Study 2: Australia 
 
14.18 Australia was one of the first countries to restructure to enable wider 
participation in higher education.191 The results of those changes made it a 
leader internationally in the movement from elite to mass systems. This process 
was broadly perceived to have been successful; Australia has for some time 
enjoyed one of the highest graduation rates in the OECD countries and higher 
education has become a significant contributor to the export economy.192    
 
14.19 Despite these successes the Australian higher education landscape has 
been characterised by turbulence over the last 30 years. Over this period there 
has been much focus on the specific roles of key stakeholder bodies.    
 
14.20 Decision-making, regulation and governance for higher education are 
shared among the Australian government (Commonwealth), the state and 
territory governments and the institutions themselves. Universities are self-
accrediting.193  Most are established through state and territory legislation, 
though some (for historical reasons) are established under Commonwealth 
legislation. HEIs are subject to a wide range of state and territory legislation in 
                                                 
191 OECD (2007) Thematic Review of Tertiary Education - Country Background Report: Australia, 
Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training  
192 OECD, 2006, Education at a Glance 2006 
http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,2340,en_2649_201185_37328564_1_1_1_1,00.html  
193 The Australian (federal) government is known as the Commonwealth.  Australia is comprised 
of _ States and Two Territories. 
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addition to their enabling legislation, including financial administration and audit 
Acts, commercial activities, borrowing and investment powers.   
 
14.21 There are 37 public universities, two private universities and around 150 
other providers of higher education in Australia.194 195 Each public university has 
its own enabling legislation however, which defines its goals and mission. Each 
receives the vast majority of their public funding from the Commonwealth in line 
with the Higher Education Support Act 2003.196
 
Autonomy 
 
14.22 Australian HEIs have a high level of autonomy. They independently set 
institutional direction and priorities including curriculum, course profile, staffing, 
internal allocation of resources and capital programmes. The Australian higher 
education sector is viewed as highly responsive to the changing labour market 
opportunities for graduates. The clearest evidence is seen in the proliferation of 
purpose-built vocationally-oriented degrees directed at specific labour markets in 
the professions.197
 
Issues within higher education 
 
14.23 However, these successes belie an undercurrent of difficulties Australian 
higher education has had in defining the specific role and responsibilities of the 
main higher education stakeholders. For more than two decades there has been 
                                                 
194 These include: ‘Other self-accrediting higher education providers’ i.e. those providers listed in 
the Australian Qualifications Framework Register as empowered their own awards and ‘Non self-
accrediting higher education providers’ i.e. providers recognised under state legislation and offer 
at least one course of study that is accredited as a higher education award 
195 OECD (2007) Thematic Review of Tertiary Education - Country Background Report: Australia, 
Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training 
196 ibid 
197 OECD (2007) Thematic Review of Tertiary Education - Country Background Report: Australia, 
Canberra Department of Education, Science and Training 
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a level of debate about rationalising or re-distributing responsibilities within higher 
education.198
  
14.24 The role of the Commonwealth199 is central to this issue. Under the current 
system the Commonwealth retains a strong influence over higher education as 
the largest single source of funding and through its policy and accountability 
framework.200  201   
 
14.25 However, Commonwealth approaches to the management of higher 
education in Australia have changed markedly over the past two decades. 
Intervention in the period from the mid-1980s was characterised by the new 
public management ideals of accountability and minimising bureaucracy. The 
election of the Labour government in 1983 and subsequent re-election in 1987 
marked a period of intense reform through legislation enacted to increase 
ministerial control of the public service.   
 
14.26 What this meant in practice was a diminution in the number of statutory 
public sector intermediary organisations with their roles given instead to 
departmental heads, reporting directly to Ministers. The rationale was based on 
both cost efficiencies and rejection of what was seen as ambiguous lines of 
responsibility.202  
 
14.27 By the mid 1990’s, the Commonwealth’s approach had shifted towards 
market mechanisms rooted in neo-liberal ideology.203 204 HEIs were encouraged 
                                                 
198 Ibid, p69 
199 And  in particular the led by the Department EST (though other Commonwealth Government 
departments also have influence) 
200 Notably, the States ceded responsibility to the Commonwealth for funding universities in 1974. 
201 OECD (2007) Thematic Review of Tertiary Education - Country Background Report: Australia, 
Canberra Department of Education, Science and Training 
202 Meek V.L and Hayden M. (2005)  The Governance of Public Universities in Australia: Trends 
and Contemporary Issues 
203 Meek V.L. and Wood F.Q. (1997) The market as a new steering strategy for Australian higher 
education, Higher Education Policy 10(3/4),  
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to diversify income streams; becoming in effect ‘enterprise universities’.205 One 
marked effect in this respect has been the growth in attracting (fee paying) 
overseas students – by 2008 Australia’s third-largest export industry.   
 
14.28 But such changes were not routinely successful. By 2001, student to staff 
ratios had increased dramatically, academics reported less time and opportunity 
for research, and there had been a decline in traditional subjects like ‘classics’.206
 
14.29 The Nelson Report (2003) 207  to the Commonwealth government 
considered that central to the problem was a dichotomy between entrepreneurial 
organisational behaviour and the traditional core principles of universities. The 
challenge would be to reconcile the traditions of academic integrity and freedom 
with the more profit driven demands of the commercial world.208
 
14.30 The balance of responsibilities between Commonwealth and 
States/Territories has also been something of a thorny issue. Though providing 
relatively little overall funding, states/territories do have legislative powers over 
higher education and a recurrent theme has been the extent to which a). 
state/territory priorities are compared to national priorities under a system of 
(national) Commonwealth funding and b). to what extent having State/Territory 
and Commonwealth priorities leads to an overly complex and burdensome 
reporting system for HEIs.  
 
14.31 It is noticeable that in 1991 State and Commonwealth Ministers of 
Education considered but rejected the option of allocating full responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                                 
204 Coaldrake P. (2000) I’m dreaming of a White Paper, Journal of Higher Education Policy and 
Management 22(1) 
205 Marginson S., Considine M. (2000) The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and 
Reinvention in Australia, Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press, p. 4 
206 Breen J. (2002) Higher Education in Australia: Structure, Policy & Debate, Monash University 
207 Australia Commonwealth Department of Education Science and Training (2002) Higher 
Education at the Crossroad: An Overview Paper, Canberra 
208 Peter Karmel, Higher Education at the Crossroads: Response to Ministerial Discussion Paper 
http://www.backingaustraliasfuture.gov.au/submissions/crossroads/crossroads1.htm   
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higher education to the Commonwealth. The reasoning was that the links 
between HEIs and states/territories were crucial in defining and addressing more 
localised needs and moreover, were important in ensuring appropriate linkages 
between HEIs  and the state/territory controlled schooling and tertiary level 
sectors.209    
 
14.32 However, the issue re-surfaced ten years later in the Crossroads 
Review.210 It was subsequently found that there could be benefits in the 
Commonwealth taking a greater role in some regulatory areas: (e.g. governance 
and management within public universities). Recent calls for full legislative 
authority to be handed from state/territory to the Commonwealth have generally 
been met with much criticism however.211    
 
14.33 In terms of reporting systems, the neo-liberal approach of the 1990’s also 
brought with it greater levels of accountability and an emphasis on the provision 
of funds by the Commonwealth being tied to specific Commonwealth priorities. 
212  The post Crossroads Commonwealth paper Our Universities: Backing 
Australia’s Future indicated that the Commonwealth is determined to ensure that 
institutions are required to provide the minimum of reporting whilst maintaining 
the highest levels of accountability.213
 
14.34 However, the then Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee (AVCC) 
claimed that the reforms associated with Our Universities: Backing Australia’s 
Future had increased the reporting burden on universities.   
                                                 
209 Working Party on Higher Education, Report to the Australian Education Council (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991), 5.   
210 Australia Commonwealth Department of Education Science and Training (2002) Higher 
Education at the Crossroad: An Overview Paper, Canberra 
211 Most recently, a debate has been triggered by a suggestion from the Deputy-Premier of New 
South Wales that full responsibility for all 11 of that State's universities should be handed over to 
the Commonwealth. While other States and the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee promptly 
opposed the proposal, the Commonwealth Minister has expressed an interest in the idea. 
212 Meek V.L and Hayden M. (2005)  The Governance of Public Universities in Australia: Trends 
and Contemporary Issues 
213 Nelson B (2003) Our Universities: Backing Australia’s Future, Canberra: Australian Ministry for 
Education, Science and Training 
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 Response 
 
14.35 The current situation is one where the universities are accountable to the 
state/territory in which they have been established for their financial 
administration and audit. They are also accountable to the Commonwealth in the 
form of ’educational profiles’. These are produced annually and provide a basis 
for future funding decisions. They include: a strategic plan; a ‘Research and 
Research Training Management Report’; data on the allocation of funded student 
load to places in courses; capital asset management plan; equity plan; 
indigenous education strategy, and a quality assurance and improvement plan. 
 
14.36 There have been a number of intermediary type organisations.  Informally, 
the HEIs have representation through Universities Australia (previously the 
AVCC). Amongst many roles Universities Australia strives ‘to develop policy 
positions on higher education matters through discussing higher education 
issues, including teaching, research and research training’.214   
 
14.37 Similarly, the ‘Group of 8’ has been operating as an informal network of 
vice-chancellors drawn from Australia’s oldest and most research-intensive 
universities. Incorporated in 1999 – though active since 1994 – the Group’s role 
includes influencing national policies for higher education and university 
research.215
 
14.38 In terms of formal bodies, the Australian Universities Quality Agency 
(AUQA) is the principal national quality assurance agency in higher education.216  
Established by the Ministerial Council on Education, Training and Youth Affairs in 
                                                 
214 http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/page/about-us/ 
215 http://www.go8.edu.au/government-a-business 
216 http://www.auqa.edu.au/ 
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2000, it operates as a not-for-profit national agency independent of state/territory 
and Commonwealth governments.217
 
14.39 The Australian Research Council is a statutory authority within the 
Australian Government's Innovation, Industry, Science and Research portfolio. 
Set up through the Australian Research Council Act 2001 Council advises the 
Government on research matters, manages the National Competitive Grants 
Program.  In effect the Council undertakes a ‘buffer role’ between the 
Commonwealth and the universities in relation to research and research 
training.218
 
14.40 This makes it more puzzling why there is currently no wider intermediary 
(buffer) organisation like those found in the UK and many other ‘Anglo’ 
countries.219 A glance at Australia’s past systems reveals that such bodies have 
existed in the fairly recent past. The Commonwealth Tertiary Education 
Commission was the last of these. From 1974 to 1987 it fostered ‘a stable and 
predictable policy environment’ and was ‘internally flexible’, and because for 
many years the Commission had ‘a monopoly of funding, expertise and 
authority.’ 
 
14.41 However, like many other public bodies the Commission was scrapped in 
1987; a move that strengthened government control over HEIs 220 but also 
pointed to a fundamental weaknesses in the buffer approach as applied to the 
Australian context.221 In particular, to be successful an intermediary (buffer) must 
                                                 
217 Notably, on issues of research, the Research Quality Framework’ modelled on the UK’s 
Research Assessment Exercise was scrapped in 2007 over fears about the high operational 
costs of the approach.  
218 http://www.arc.gov.au/about_arc/default.htm 
219 Nelson B (2002), Higher education at the crossroads: An overview paper (Canberra: 
Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training, 2002), 5   
220 Duckett  S.J. (2004) Turning right at the crossroads: The Nelson Report’s proposals to 
transform Australia’s universities, Higher Education 47: 211–240, Netherlands:  Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 
221 Marshall M. (1990) End of an Era: the Collapse of the 'buffer' Approach to the Governance of 
Australian Tertiary Education, Higher Education 19: 150.   
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able to deal with, and balance, the needs of the government (at all levels). The 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission did this through a complex 
system of 'consultative arrangements' that allowed it to respond to both levels of 
government.  
 
14.42 At the same time an increasing number of agencies and government 
departments identified the importance of higher education to meeting their own 
aims.  The magnitude and diversity of their needs and viewpoints created new 
pressures and demands on the Commonwealth government.  As a result the 
‘guidelines' issued by the Commonwealth to the Commission became 
substantially more detailed and, framed within policy objectives, increasingly 
contradictory (e.g. budgetary austerity while pursuing a widening participation 
agenda).  Against a backdrop of impatient desire for reform - driven by the 
Commonwealth’s belief that higher education could contribute more effectively 
and directly to national goals - the Commission’s lengthy consultation process 
was perceived as unsuccessful.   
 
14.43 However, some commentators have called for the re-establishment of the 
statutory intermediary like the commission.222  They point to the Tertiary 
Education Commission in New Zealand as an example of the benefits such a 
body may bring not only in the practical issues such as the allocation of funding 
and specialist advice to government, but also (within limits) in the collating and 
presenting to HEIs the numerous and sometimes disparate priorities of 
government.    
 
Case Study 3: Austria 
 
14.44 Higher education in Austria is provided by universities, universities of 
applied sciences / Vocational Universities (Fachhochschulen) and Academies 
(e.g. Teacher Training Colleges). There are 22 public universities, 18 
                                                 
222 Nelson B (2002) Higher education at the crossroads: An overview paper, Canberra: Commonwealth 
Department of Education, Science and Training 
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Fachhochschulen and ten private universities.  The Federal Government, 
specifically the Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur) retains accountability 
primarily through funding arrangements. 
 
Autonomy 
 
14.45 Traditionally, universities in Austria were financed fully by the federal 
government223 through a direct negotiating process with each university. Though 
Austrian universities were firmly self-administered in academic issues, all 
academic staff and administrators were paid public servants of the Government.  
 
14.46 However, like most European countries, Austria was affected by the 
financial crisis of the late 1980’s.  Disputes over funding – fuelled primarily by 
financial cutbacks in the university sector224 – strained the previously consensus-
oriented relationship between government and the HE sector.  Central to the 
issue was inertia inherent; Pellert (1999) identifies slow decision making as a 
characteristic of the centuries old institutions dominated by an academic 
oligarchy.225   
 
14.47 Since 1990 the Austrian higher education system has undergone 
substantial reforms.  These have not only modified internal governance 
mechanisms of HEIs but restructured the entire higher education system. The 
process has not been without controversy, however. 
 
14.48 The University Organisation Amendment Act (1993)226 was designed to 
bring new and more efficient internal structures: universities were encouraged to 
                                                 
223 Usually the Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture or its forerunners 
224 Though a European wide movement towards mass education within the context of an already 
famously open higher education system in Austria, must have added considerable pressures. 
225 Pellert A. (2003) Politik als Reformhindernis in Luthje J. and Nickel S. (eds): 
Universitatsentwicklung. Strategien, Erfahrungen, Reflexionen. Frankfurt am Main, S. 19-25. 
226 Universitatsorganisationsgesetz (1993) 
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be more entrepreneurial and competitive through a more market orientated 
approach.  Again not all universities were quick to respond, and there were 
varying levels of resistance.227 Moreover changes within university management 
were not supported in a cultural sense, with parallel changes at the Government 
level.228 Against a backdrop of reductions in Government funding, inevitable 
tensions grew and the Act was deemed unsuccessful. 
 
14.49 In March 1999 the Ministry of Education sought consultation on the issue 
of legally autonomous universities (vollrechtsfähige Universitäten). This led to 
amended legislation that enabled universities for the first time to charge tuition 
fees and themselves employ academic and administrative staff.   
 
14.50 This process culminated in the 2002 University Reform which redefined the 
relationship between the universities and the state. Since then the Ministry has  
assumed a supervisory function only in legal affairs but continues to be 
responsible for strategic planning and research. The universities remain primarily 
state funded though they are fully autonomous in their internal affairs and 
formulate their own statutes. The law requires the establishment of a university 
board (Universitätsrat) at each institution which comprises leading figures from 
public life and the private sector.  
 
14.51 Two key reforms stand out: firstly, the development of the 
Fachhochschulen sector as a market based model of higher education focusing 
on vocationally orientated provision; secondly, the introduction of performance 
related funding measures as a means of ensuring accountability. 
 
14.52 Decentralisation is a core characteristic of the Fachhochschulen sector.  
These institutions operate as private entities (equivalent to limited liability 
                                                 
227 Nickel, S., Witte J.  and Ziegele F. (2006) Universitatszugang und –finanzierung. Analyse der 
osterreichischen Hochschulsteuerung und Perspektiven. 
228 Zechlin, L. (2002) Die osterreichische Politik verabschiedet sich von der strategischen 
Steuerung ihrer Universitaten in zeitschrift fur hochschulrecht, hochschulmanagement und 
hochschulpolitik (zfhr), Heft 4/2002 
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companies) and are run on market based principles.229 The main function of the 
Austrian Fachhochschulen is the provision of higher education to the regional 
economy. This means that Fachhochschulen vary in coverage across Austria 
according to specific needs – particularly of private businesses - of the region in 
which they are found.230   
 
14.53 The 2002 reforms also introduced revised funding and accountability 
procedures within the higher education system. In particular, use is made of 
allocated budget based around a fixed formula:  
• 80% of the total budget is allocated on the basis of negotiated performance 
contracts;  
• 20% of the total amount for all universities is allocated on the basis of 
performance indicators and indicators of social objectives. 231  
 
14.54 The first performance contracts were introduced through public law in 2007 
for a period of three years. The process involves direct negotiation between the 
government and individual universities to determine funding levels based upon 
requirement, demand and various social objectives (e.g. increased 
internationalisation and mobility). Universities present specific plans to meet the 
agreed objectives and targets.232   
 
14.55 The strength of this approach is firstly, it allows the state to agree specific 
priorities and targets with each university. Secondly, the approach allows 
universities complete latitude in determining how they achieve an agreed defined 
                                                 
229  Leitner E. (2006) Austria´s Fachhochschulen and the Market-Based-Model. In: International 
Higher Education Nr. 42/Winter. 
(http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/Number42/p8_Leitner.htm) 
230 Lassnigg L., Unger M., Pechar H., Pellert A., Schmutzer-Hollensteiner E, and Westerheijden 
D. (2003) Review des Auf- und Ausbaus des Fachhochschulsektors. Studie im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums fur Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur (bm:bwk).  
231 Österreichische Austauschdienst (OeAD)  (2010) The Austrian Higher Education System 
Vienna: OeAD 
232 Rhoades G. and Barbara S. (2002) Quality assurance in Europe and the U.S.: Professional 
and political economic framing of higher education policy, Higher Education 43: 355–390, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic  
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priority target. In other words universities retain their operational independence.  
That the process is underpinned by agreement might also be considered a 
strength point, though some may suggest that limited transparency within the 
process is an important weakness.233  
 
14.56 Twenty per cent of the university budget is awarded according to 
performance indicators in relation to: teaching, research and development and 
social goals. The budget is derived via a complex formula. 
 
14.57 In reporting progress against targets each University completes an 
intellectual capital report (Wissensbilanz). This provides an overall assessment of 
the University’s activities and of and performance. This instrument is considered 
unique in European higher education and in that it provides the Ministry with 
comprehensive information on:  
 
• each university’s activities, social goals and self-imposed objectives and 
strategies; 
• each university’s intellectual capital, broken down into human, structural and 
relationship capital; 
• the processes set out in the performance agreement, including their outputs 
and impacts.234 
 
14.58 The Austrian system offers an example of direct governmental control 
within a higher education system that has undergone significant liberalization. 
The 2002 reforms brought a new impetus to the higher education sector in 
Austria. Primarily they illustrate innovative ways of overcoming institutional inertia 
(that is within the traditional universities) and generating market orientated 
                                                 
233 Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies (2006) The extent and impact of higher education 
governance reform across Europe, Final report to the Directorate-General for Education and 
Culture of the European Commission 
234 Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies (2006) The extent and impact of higher education 
governance reform across Europe, Final report to the Directorate-General for Education and 
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exemplars (i.e. Fachhochschulen sector) that can be used as a benchmark by all 
higher education institutions.  Moreover, they testify to the importance of a 
comprehensive response (i.e. the failure of the 1993 (part) reforms) and offer an 
insight into the sorts of direct accountability mechanisms available to government 
within a wider context espousing increased HEI autonomy. 
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